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CHAEfER I. THE HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIABLE CERTIFICATE 
OF DEPOSIT AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Commercial banks, savings and loan associations, savings banks, and 
insurance companies are examples of financial institutions. The nature of 
their assets, largely claims on other institutions and individuals, sets 
them apart from other forms of business. However, it is the liability 
side of the commercial bank's balance sheet that sets it apart from other 
financial institutions, While most financial institutions receive and 
hold funds of the public, only commercial banks can maintain deposits 
(demand deposits) that are directly transferable by check. 
Banks also maints.in another category of deposits, the time deposit, 
which is not transferable by check. The technical distinction between 
demand and time deposits was first set forth in the National Bank Act of 
1863 which stated 
...demand deposits...comprise all deposits payable within thirty 
days and time deposits shall comprise all deposits payable after 
thirty days. 
Today, the Federal Reserve System further classifies time deposits 
into three categories: (1) savings deposits, (2) time certificates of 
deposits (CD's) and (3) time deposit, open account.^ Savings deposits 
may only be held by individuals or nonprofit organizations such as clubs 
and fraternal organizations. On the other hand, no restrictions are 
placed on the ownership of time certificates of deposits (CD's) or time 
deposits, open account. Time deposits, open account are generally used 
for special purposes such as Christmas Clubs or vacation clubs. The open 
^Regulation Q, Section 217.1, page 3, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. 
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account is evidenced by a contract stating the terms of deposit and may 
be increased by the depositor, usually by certain minimum amounts over the 
life of the contract. CD's represent the deposit of a fixed amount which 
the bank agrees to pay back in a specified period of time (30 days or 
longer) plus a specified amount of interest. The CD may be issued in 
transferable form (negotiable) allowing it to be transferred from one 
individual or organization to another before maturity or it may be issued 
in nontransferable form (nonnegotiable). The holder of a nonnegotiable 
CD, under normal conditions, must wait until his CD matures in order to 
get his funds. It is with the large negotiable CD, where large means 
$100,000 or more, that this study is concerned. Unless otherwise stated 
the abbreviation CD will be used to represent large negotiable CD's. 
The next section of this chapter is provided as background for those 
2 
not familiar with the CD. 
Development of the Negotiable CD 
The time certificate of deposit is not a new instrument to commercial 
banking. Time certificates of deposit have been used by Midwestern and 
Southern banks since the early 1900's. While early CD's were issued on 
a negotiable as well as a nonnegotiable basis, the former were not truly 
marketable since no secondary market existed in which they could be sold 
and had only legal negotiability in that they could be transferred from 
one individual to another. Large New York City banks would not issue 
certificates of this type to corporations and in general were strongly 
2 
For a complete and detailed discussion of the CD's early develop­
ment, see A, Gilbert Heebner's unpublished dissertation [14]. 
3 
reluctant to issue time deposits to corporations. The reasoning behind 
this reluctance was the belief of the bankers that funds would flow from 
demand deposits to time deposits with the prospect of increased costs to 
bankers. By law no interest could be paid on demand deposits while 
interest could be paid on time deposits up to a maximum rate by law. 
On February 20, 1961, the First National City Bank of New York broke 
this tradition and announced that it would offer CD's to both individuals 
and corporations in minimum amounts of $1,000,000. At the same time, 
Discount Corporation of New York City, a dealer in U.S. Government 
securities, announced that it would maintain a secondary market in the 
CD's issued by the First National City Bank. The creation of a secondary 
market not only added to the negotiability of the CD's but provided 
marketability as well. Following this announcement, major banks in New 
York City and other large cities also announced a readiness to issue CD's 
to corporations. These banks indicated that, in keeping with the rates 
of other money market instruments, offering rates would be determined from 
day-to-day, subject to Regulation Q interest rate ceilings. According to 
the banks, the principal reason for issuing CD's to corporations was to 
attract those funds lost when corporations used their idle balances to 
purchase existing money market instruments. 
As can be seen in Figure 1.1, CD growth between 1961 and the present 
was not steady and CD volume dropped sharply in 1966 and 1969. Main­
tenance of Regulation Q ceilings below money market rates during 1966 and 
1969 greatly limited the CD's competitiveness (discussion of Regulation 
Q and its administration will be deferred until Chapter II), 
Outstanding 
CD Volume 
• (billions 
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40 
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1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Figure 1.1, Volume of outstanding negotiable certificates of deposit (quarterly levels). 
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CD Characteristics 
CD's have been offered in a variety of denominations, ranging from 
$25,000 to $10,000,000, Actual certificate size depends upon the size of 
the issuing bank and the needs of its customers. Smaller banks account 
for the CD's at the lower end of the denomination range. More typically 
the denominations are $100,000, $500,000 and $1,000,000. The larger New 
York City banks (those with deposits greater than $1 billion) generally 
dislike issuing CD's below $1,000,000. 
Issuers: prime, lessor-prime, and off-prime 
As the CD market grew in size, buyers in both the primary and 
secondary markets developed classifications of banks issuing large CD's. 
A bank is classified as either prime, lessor-prime or off-prime according 
to the relative marketability of its CD's, The prime group consists of 
12 to 30 banks, lessor-prime group consists of about 45, and all other 
issuers are classified as off-prime. Prime banks generally have deposits 
exceeding $1 billion and account for the largest share of CD's. 
Issue rates 
The prime group of banks issue CD's at the "best" rates when regula­
tion Q ceilings permit--about one-fourth of a percentage point above rates 
on comparable maturities of U.S. Treasury bills. Certificates of the 
lessor-prime group of banks carry a spread of 5 to 10 points about the 
3 
"best" rates. Other issuers--the off-prime group—generally must pay 
3 
A point is .01 of a percentage point, thus there are 100 points in 
one percent. 
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one-eighth to one-fourth of a percentage point more than prime 
banks, although they may negotiate special rates with particular 
customers. Also all rates may be slightly higher if the CD denomina­
tion is less than $1,000,000. Some smaller banks which are well 
known and respected in communities outside the major money markets 
of New York City may tap regional markets at the same and sometimes 
lower rates of interest. Certificates are issued and traded on a 
yield to maturity basis with 360 days considered one year. 
Secondary market 
Development of a secondary market for CD's began early in the 
spring of 1961 with the announcement of the Discount Corporation of 
New York that it would provide a market--that is maintain an inven­
tory and buy or sell at quoted rates. Other nonbank dealers in 
U.S. government securities entered the field and the core of the 
secondary market developed around five leading financial houses; 
the other four members of this group consisted of Salomon Brothers 
& Hutzler, First Boston Corporation, C. J. Devine and Co., and 
New York Hanseatic Corporation. Several Bank dealers in U.S. 
government securities joined the nonbank dealers in 1965 and 1966. 
Among those joining were Bankers Trust Company, Bank of America, 
and the First National City Bank of New York. 
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CD maturities 
Data has been available since 1964 on the maturity distribution of 
CD's.^ During the period from 1964 to 1974 the average monthly maturity 
of all outstanding CD's has varied from 2.0 months to 4.4 months (see 
Figure 1.2). A slight downward trend in maturity was present from 1964 
through early 1968.^ From 1968 through 1972 no appreciable trend was 
present. 
A breakdown of CD maturity by size of bank indicates that there is 
a tendency for CD maturity to vary proportionately with bank size. In 
four of the seven years from 1965 to 1971 this relationship held across 
all four size classifications used (see Table 1.1). 
Geographic distribution 
While the volume of CDs issued by each of the twelve Federal Reserve 
Districts has increased sharply since 1961, the respective share of out­
standing CD's has remained relatively constant. Since 1961, three 
districts, New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, have accounted for the 
bulk of outstanding CD's. The New York District, primarily through CD 
sales by New York money market banks, has consistently accounted for one 
third of available CD's. New York's portion reached a peak in 1965, 
reaching nearly 48 percent of outstanding CD's, and a low in 1969 with 
slightly over 31 percent of outstanding CD's. 
4 
Federal Reserve Board Statistical Release G.9: Maturity Distribution 
of outstanding Negotiable Time CD's in U.S. 
^Trend was established by using linear regressions with seasonally 
adjusted values of maturity as the dependent variable and time as the in­
dependent variable. The coefficient of time was not significant for the 
period 1968 to 1972. 
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Figure 1.2. Average maturity of all outstanding negotiable certificates of deposit 
(quarterly levels) 
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Table 1.1. Annual average of CD maturity length expressed in months 
Bank Size 
Under $200-$500 $500 million $1 billion 
Year $200 million million -$1 billion and over 
1965 4.2 3.8 3.5 3.8 
1966 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.4 
1967 3.0 3.4 3.4 3.5 
1968 2.8 3.2 3.2 3.3 
1969 2.8 3.2 3.3 3.4 
1970 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.5 
1971 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.2 
1972 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.1 
1973 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.4 
1974 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.0 
CD purchasers 
Federal Reserve Board surveys show that corporations are the primary 
source of funds for CD's. Funds needed for future events, such as tax 
and divident payments, find their way into CD's largely because of the 
flexibility of CD maturities. Roughly 70 percent of CD funds come from 
corporations; the next largest category, state and local governments, 
account for 10 to 15 percent of CD sales. The remaining sources of funds 
are bank trust funds, savings and loan associations, foreign central banks, 
and individuals. 
By the end of 1961 New York City banks had over $1 billion in CD's 
outstanding, nearly $2 billion by the end of 1962, $4.5 billion in 1964, 
and $7.4 billion in mid-1966. Today, early 1975, the large New York City 
banks have over 30 billion in CD's outstanding and commercial banks across 
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the country have over $80 billion outstanding. In terms of volume, the 
CD has become the U.S.*s most important money market instrument, not even 
exceeded by U.S. Treasury bills. 
Empirical Work on CD's 
While numerous articles and reports have been written on the CD, 
the number of studies involving empirical analysis--regression analysis--
have been limited. Four studies were found involving CD's and of these, 
three involved the use of CD's by banks. The fourth study focused on 
corporate use of the CD for investment and liquidity purposes. 
Gilbert Heebner's dissertation was the first study of CD's involving 
regression analysis [14]. Heebner sought to identify factors or variables 
that influenced negotiable CD volume. He first presented a list of 
hypotheses which he developed from "the benefit of viewpoints expressed 
by bankers and other participants in the CD market." The hypotheses were 
then tested by means of multiple regression analysis on monthly CD data 
for New York City banks classified as "weekly reporters" by the Federal 
Reserve System for the years 1962 to 1965. Regressions were run on 
unadjusted monthly data and on first differences in unadjusted monthly 
data. 
Heebner's equations included both demand factors (demand for funds 
by banks) and supply factors (supply of funds to banks). Explanatory 
variables identified by Heebner as demand variables were: (1) average 
reserve position of eight banks in the previous month, (2) average total 
loans in New York banks in the following month, (3) average holdings of 
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"other securities" in New York banks. Explanatory variables designated 
as supply variables were: (1) total corporate tex payments, (2) total 
(adjusted) corporate cash divident payments, (3) six month CD and 
Treasury bill interest differential, and (4) six month CD and finance 
company commercial paper interest differential. 
Heebner rejected the regression results on the unadjusted monthly 
data because of extremely poor Durbin-Watson ratios which indicated the 
presence of serial correlationso However, the regression results on the 
first differences of the unadjusted data were statistically reliable 
and explained up to fifty percent of the monthly change in outstanding 
volume of CD's. 
The results of Heebner's regression analysis may be subjected to 
serious questioning. Heebner's use of demand and supply variables in the 
same equation(s) is highly questionable, Heebner chooses to ignore 
identification problems with the use of multiple regression techniques. 
In addition one variable, six month CD and Treasury bill differential, 
identified as a supply variable, can just as easily be classified as a 
demand variable. In fact, any standard supply and demand analysis in­
cludes the price of the object in both the supply and demand relation-
9 
ships. Finally, several variables, although statistically significant, 
may not even be factors which affect either the demand for or supply of 
CD's. 
Chronologically, the second study was Jerry L. Jordan's dissertation 
submitted to the University of California at Los Angeles in March, 1969 
[17], Jordan's study presented theoretical and statistical evidence on 
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the determinants of an individual's decision to hold wealth in alternative 
forms of deposit type financial assets. Jordan dealt with demand and 
supply relationships for total time deposits at commercial banks, 
negotiable CD's, savings and loan association shares, and mutual savings 
bank deposits. He began his study with the development of a general 
theoretical framework for analyzing the demand for and supply of alterna­
tive financial assets, 
Jordan's general demand function for the jth financial asset 
expressed in general equation form is as follows: 
A.^ = f (Yp, Ym, ij, i^, i^, Pg, TC, IC, 0) 
where 
Yp permanent income in constant prices 
Ym 
= 
measured or realized income in constant prices 
'j 
= interest yield on the jth asset 
^o 
= interest yield on other assets 
^e 
= 
expected level of interest rates 
Pe 
= 
expected price level 
TC = transaction cost 
a. travel to financial institutions 
b. commissions on stock and bond transactions 
IC = information cost and liquidity 
a. risk and uncertainty 
b. insurance 
c. spot bid ask price spread 
d. yield 
e. other 
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0 = nonpecuniary returns 
Hypothesized partiels are as follows: 
< 0 (bonds and stocks) 
S^e 
A-d 
^ > 0 (deposits; fixed current prices) 
^ ? (did not specify) 
e 
l#<0 
— 0 (did not specify) 
oU > 
Jordan's hypothesis in verbal form is that the demand for a 
financial asset is a function of wealth, the expected monetary returns 
of the asset, the expected nonmonetary returns of the asset, monetary and 
nonmonetary returns of other assets, variances of return on each asset, 
costs of acquiring the asset, and uncertainty which may be associated 
with the asset concerning returns of principal, payment of interest, or 
liquidity. 
Jordan's general framework for the supply of monetary assets was 
primarily aimed at explaining the supply of liabilities of deposit-type 
nongovernment financial intermediaries. Jordan's framework was developed 
in terms of a financial intermediary which holds only one type of earning 
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monetary asset--mortgages. (Jordan, however, did believe his framework 
could be expanded to any number of type of earning assets.) 
Jordan assumed the supply of deposit type asset to be a function 
(positive) of the supply of earning assets (mortgages) to the supplier 
of Aj and a function (negative) of the cost of "intermediating." Jordan 
further asserted that a reduced form equation representing the supply of 
Aj would contain the following explanatory variables: a) those factors 
which influence the market supply of mortgages, b) those factors which 
influence the demand for mortgages by sources other than the supplier of 
Aj, and factors which represent other costs of operations incurred by 
the supplier of A^. In addition the following assumptions were made by 
Jordan: a) the market supply of mortgages is negatively related to the 
interest rate paid on them (that is, the demand for funds from sources 
which offer mortgages as collateral is negatively related to the price 
paid for the funds, i.e., the interest rate); b) the demand for mortgages 
is a positive function of their yield. Jordan summarized his model with 
the assertion that (other things equal) "an increase in the total supply 
of mortgages will result in an increase in the supply of A^, which in 
turn will result in a higher interest rate being offered for A^, assuming 
no change in the demand for A^." 
In his analysis on CD's, Jordan used quarterly U.S. data from 1962 
to 1967. His stated goal was to "provide evidence on the importance of 
some of the factors which affect the outstanding volume of CD's" [17, 
p. 130]. He hypothesized with respect to CD's that the quantity of CD's 
demanded would depend on the yield of CD's relative to the yield on 
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risk-equivalent substitutes. He also asserted that interest rate 
expectations influenced the demand for CD's, While accepting the 
thought that different maturities of CD's would be influenced in per­
haps totally opposite ways by interest rate expectations, Jordan asserted 
that the demand for CD's (as opposed to demand for a longer term 
security) as a short-term earning asset would be positively influenced 
by expected interest rates. 
Jordan, faced with a limited sample size, included only a few 
explanatory variables in each equation. The variables used and their 
symbols are as follows: 
r^*^ = new issue rate on CD's maturing in six months 
r^ = new issue rate on three month treasury bills 
r^ = average rate paid on short-term business loans at 
large commercial banks 
0 6 i = expected interest rate 
cd 
—— = ratio of the new issue rate on CD's to the new 
r 
issue rate ca treasury bills 
CP = corporate profits 
FFl = flow of funds wealth proxy—net acquisition of 
financial assets by all major sectors 
The expected interest rate was generated according to the equation: 
It = - X 't -1-
16 
FF2 = FFl plus gross savings of corporate nonfinanclal 
business - and net surplus of state and local 
governments 
BL = average outstanding business loans at large 
commercial banks 
Analysis of Jordan's equations produced the following conclu­
sions : 
1, The demand for CD's was found to be highly responsive to 
the yields on CD's (positive) and negatively related to 
the cross yield on hypothesized substitutes. 
2, The supply of CD's was found also to be responsive to 
yields on CD's, however, the value sign (positive) of 
the CD yield was opposite to that expected in a supply 
equation,^ 
3, The coefficient of the yield on business loans was also 
significant at the .05 percent level, but except for one 
case, also opposite to that expected. 
Jordan's regression results are shown below: 
Jordan felt that perhaps the small size of his samples used in 
regression may have contributed results contrary to those hypothesized. 
The presence of signs opposite to those hypothesized may also indicate 
the presence of Identification problems. 
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Supply Equation Demand Equation 
cd 
i^ 
t 
r 
CP 
FFl 
FF2 
BL 
sign as 
hypothesized 
- no 
not entered 
significant 
at .05 level 
yes 
- no (with one mixed 
exception) 
not entered 
mixed yes 
not entered 
not entered 
not entered 
- no (except yes 
one case) 
sign as 
hypothesized 
+ yes 
- yes 
not entered 
+ no 
+ yes 
+ yes 
+ yes 
+ yes 
not entered 
significant 
at .05 level 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
The third study is that of Sandra B. Cohan, entitled "The determi­
nants of supply and demand for certificates of deposit" [6]. Cohan first 
presented models to explain the supply price of both negotiable and non-
negotiable CD's. A model was also developed to explain the demand for 
CD's by corporations and individuals. The predictions of these models 
were then tested by single equation regression analysis and then by two 
stage least squares. 
Cohan builds her model upon the assumption that banks are concerned 
with both risk and yield and that within this framework will seek to meet 
new or additional loan requests (as might be associated with an upturn in 
18 
the business cycle) by selling open market securities accumulated during 
periods of economic lull. However, as banks seek to satisfy loan demands 
their liquidity position is decreased. Rising yields on business loans, 
which accompany economic expansions, make it increasingly profitable to 
issue interest-bearing CD's at rates competitive with competing open 
market instruments. Thus, Cohan asserts, beyond a certain decrease in 
the liquidity position of banks, one should expect CD's to be used to 
further loan growth. Accompanying the increase in deposits growth 
resulting from the issuance of CD's, the banker should expect increased 
costs associated with interest payments. Thus Cohan asserts the supply 
of CD's can be expected to respond to anticipated strength in loan 
demand, to yields on loans, and to competitive liquid asset market rates. 
Ceiling restrictions set by the Federal Reserve Board, through Regulation 
Q, were also assumed to be a constraining factor. 
Once a bank decides the level of CD's that it wishes it simulta­
neously arrives at a desired level of CD rates. It is assumed that banks 
make partial adjustments over a given interval (quarterly) to remove the 
discrepancy between desired and existing rates offered on CD's. Cohan 
presented the following adjustment model for negotiable CD's: 
A^CD ~ ^ (^CD " ^CD ^ ®CD 
where 
r^P = observed CD rate 
r^g ^ = observed CD rate in the previous period 
* 
r^jj = unobserved desired CD rate 
= random disturbance term 
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X = adjustment coefficient (0 ^ x ^ 1) 
X is expected to be large as banks are in a position to adjust CD 
rates on a daily basis. 
In the absence of a rate ceiling a bank following through the 
assumptions presented above would set Its CD's according to the strength 
of loan demand, competing asset yields, and the availability of funds 
from other sources. Using the treasury bill rate r^y as a proxy, an 
upward sloping curve AA' can be presented (Figure 1.3). 
A' 
/ 
B ^ y 
/ y 
/ 
X 
/ 
X 
r 
Figure 1,3. Individual offer function 
Imposing ceiling r^ sets an upward limit on r^^ yielding an effec­
tive supply curve ABQ, 
An aggregate supply relationship, taking into account that some 
banks may desire a rate greater than Regulation Q and some less than 
Regulation Q, produces the supply relationship presented in Figure 1.4. 
CD 
Figure 1.4. Aggregate CD Supply 
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Cohan's theory, presented in the previous two paragraphs, used the 
following transformation as an approximation [6]: 
'CD 
Further modification taking into account the theory of commercial bank 
behavior produced the following: 
'cD* - fq - ' (fq/'tb) 
Combining the two equations yields: 
^CD = ' *l^q/^tb ^2^CD-1 ®CD 
Empirical analysis of this model proved unsatisfactory and the 
equation was run again without suppressing the intercept term. Instead, 
a dummy variable D was introduced which took on values of 1 whenever the 
secondary rate on CD's exceeded Regulation Q ceilings and 0 otherwise. 
Nonnegotiable CD's 
Cohan assumed that a complete supply model for CD's by commercial 
banks should include an equation to explain the supply price of CD's 
(r^). It was assumed that personal nonnegotiable CD's interest rates are 
in part determined by the same factors as negotiable CD rates 
Accordingly, the negotiable CD rate was included as an explanatory vari­
able. Competitive liquid assets were represented by including savings 
and loan association rates and commercial bank savings deposits 
interest rate rg^. The short term bank loan rate r^^ was also included 
to reflect loan demand pressures. Expressed in the following linear 
equation the commercial bank supply price of personal CD's became: 
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"p = bo + h'sD + + ^ 3^ 0, + \'bl 
Model of Demand for CD's 
The demand model presented seeks to explain the public's demand 
for CD's at weekly reporting large commercial banks. It is assumed that 
total liquid asset holdings are given, and the problem is one of deter­
mining what portion of these liquid assets will be held as CD's, 
Operating from the theory of consumer demand Cohan specifies the demand 
for CD's to be a function of their price, the prices of other liquid 
assets, income and tastes. Expressed in equation form total demand for 
CD/IA become: 
CD/IA . Co + (r^ - + C3W 
+ (AY - K) + CjSj+ CgSg + CySj 
where : 
^CD 
= yield on CD negotiable 
= yield on CD nonnegotiable 
^SD 
= interest on savings deposit 
11 , 
W = wealth variable of the form W = .139 2 (.9)^GNP 
1=1 
6Y-K = transitory income where Y is current GNP and K is 
the average growth in GNP 
^l'^2 
Sg = seasonal dummy variables 
Ordinary least squares regression analysis using quarterly data 
covering 26 quarters from the third quarter, 1961, to the fourth quarter 
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for both the supply and demand equations produced the following 
for negotiable CD's. 
r_„ = .8336 r^  - 2.6405 r_/r^ , + 1.599 r„^  - .1175 D + 2.818 
LU q q to LU 
(.0517) (.1976) (.0535) (.0573) 
= .994 
SE = .065 
DW = 2.085 
CD/IA = -7.3633 + .4188 (r^  ^- r^ )^ + .4615 (r^  - rg^ ) 
(.2239) (.2367) 
+ 7.60 3 W - .0273 (6Y-k) - .4096 S^  + .2576 - .0878 S^  
(.4359) (.4894) (.1250) (.2794) 
R^  = .995 
SE = .490 
m = 2.190 
Results for nonnegotiable CD's were as follows: 
r = -4.2902 + .8778 r„_ + .8269 r_, + .1618 r^  ^+ .1926 r,, 
p oD o JL DL 
(.1549) (.1586) (.0501) (.0563) 
R^  = .986 
SE = .070 
DW = 1.428 
In the nonnegotiable CD price regression each sign agreed with expec­
tations and every coefficient was significant at the .01 level. The 
Durbin-Watson statistic was in the region of indeterminacy. 
of 1967 
results 
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Cohan, bringing together her three-equation model, argues that the 
model represents a recursive system in which the values of the endogenous 
variables emerge in sequence [6]. The supply price of negotiable CD's is 
determined only by exogenous variables, the supply price of personal CD's 
is determined by both exogenous variables and one endogenous variable, 
the negotiable CD rate, and finally the demand for CD's is determined 
by exogenous variables, and both the negotiable and personal CD endogenous 
variables. 
More specifically, Cohan asserted that her three equation model is 
a block recursive system composed of the two equation supply block and the 
one equation demand block. She asserted that while the disturbance terms 
in the supply block should, in principle, be interdependent there is no 
reason to suppose that the disturbance term in the demand equation is 
correlated with those in the supply block. On this basis the demand 
equation can properly be estimated by ordinary least squares with no 
simultaneity bias, while the supply block must be re-estimated to take 
account of the within-block simultaneity. 
Cohan, to obtain consistent estimations for the supply prices of 
CD's, first obtained estimates for r^  ^by using the supply equation 
specified earlier in the section on supply analysis. Replacing r^  ^with 
predicted values from the r^  ^supply equation and re-estimating by 
ordinary least squares, Cohan obtained the following TSLS estimate: 
r = -4.3413 + .8900 r, 
P 
(.1715) 
SD + "8290 ^ si •*" '1541 + '1*84 
(.1679) (.0568) (.0596) 
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= .984 
SE = .074 
DW = 1.482 
Re-estimation by two stage least squares yields results quite close 
to those obtained from ordinary least squares. Coefficient signs 
remained unchanged and continued significant at the ,01 level. 
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CHAPTER II. REGUIATION Q'S HISTORY AND USE 
DURING THE I960'S AND EARLY 1970'S 
Bankers in 1961 justified their change in policy towards the issuance 
of CD's to corporations on the grounds that they felt it necessary to 
compete for funds that corporations were to an increasing extent placing 
in money market instruments. Corporate treasurers since the late 1930*8 
made use increasingly of idle cash balances by acquiring money market 
instruments whose maturity coincided with their anticipated needs for 
funds. The characteristics of the money market and the majority of its 
instruments, high liquidity, and low capital and credit risk ideally suit 
the corporate treasurer seeking a return for his funds with a high degree 
of safety. 
The development of the secondary market for CD's established the 
necessary characteristic of liquidity for the CD. Should the corporate 
treasurer discover an unexpected need for funds all that was necessary 
was the sale of the CD on the secondary market. 
The size of the financial assets of the banks first issuing CD's 
helped allay any fears of credit risk. After all, these banks were among 
the largest in the U.S. and the pillars of U.S. financial markets. Money 
market instruments must also be attractive from the standpoint of yield. 
Given two instruments of equal liquidity and equal levels of risk the 
investor will surely be drawn to that instrument offering the greater 
return. 
Regulation Q, which establishes interest rate ceilings on time 
deposits and hence CD's, serves as a limit to what banks can offer as 
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yields on CD's. Other money market instruments have no limits and thus 
whenever market rates push above Regulation Q ceilings issuance of new 
CD's becomes extremely difficult. This chapter is presented to provide 
the reader with a background of Regulation Q and its use during the I960's 
and early 1970's. 
Regulation Q Rationale 
It was the opinion of many bankers and other financial experts that 
the relatively high rates of interest paid by commercial banks on both 
demand and time deposits in the 1920's helped to set the stage for the 
banking collapse in the 1930's. Payment of high interest rates on 
deposits was believed to have forced many banks to seek lower quality and 
hence high yield loans and investments. Loans were made to corporations 
which stood little chance of weathering the economic slowdown which was to 
come in the 1930's. 
To eliminate what was believed to be destructive competition among 
banks, regulation of interest paid on deposits was introduced during the 
bank "reforms" of the 1930's. Congress, in banking reform legislation 
(Banking Acts of 1933, 1935), prohibited the payment of interest on demand 
deposits by all Federal Reserve member banks and FDIC-insured nonmember 
banks. Congress also established limits to the amount of interest that 
could be paid on time and savings deposits. Responsibility for establish­
ing interest rate ceilings on time and savings deposits was given to the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for member banks and to 
the Board of Directors of the FDIC for insured nonmember banks. 
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Regulation Q first established a 3 percent limit on interest rates 
paid on all time and savings deposits in 1933. This limit was reduced to 
2.5 percent in 1935. A schedule of maximum time deposit rates based upon 
maturities became effective in early 1936, 
As can be seen from Table 2,1 Regulation Q ceiling rates went 
unchanged from 1936 to 1957. It should also be noted that market rates 
until the late 1940's were also relatively stable. Starting with the 
late 1940's market rates began to move upward, however for the most part 
they still remained below "Q" ceilings. During the 1950's and early 
I960's the Board of Governors took the position that interest rate ceil­
ings should keep pace with market yields which were then steadily increas­
ing. Increases in rates during 1946 resulted in the first change to 
Regulation Q ceilings in over 20 years. During 1956 prime commercial 
paper was yielding 3.41 percent, three month Treasury bills were trading 
at an average of 2.67 percent, and savings and loan associations were, on 
the average, paying an effective rate of 3 percent. At the same time, 
commercial banks were paying an effective rate of 1.6 percent and suffer­
ing a relative decline in time deposits. 
While rates permitted on time deposits greater than 90 days were 
raised one half of a percentage point in January, 1957, the maximum rate 
payable on time deposits of less than 90 days remained at one percent. 
The Board of Governor's justification for this was that "there was in­
sufficient reason to prevent banks, in the exercising of management dis­
cretion, from competing actively for time and savings balances by offering 
rates more nearly in line with other market rates. By increasing the 
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Table 2.1. Regulation Q ceiling rates 1933-1966 
November 1, 1933-Julv 19, 1966 
Effective Date 
Type and maturity 
of deposit 
Nov. 
1, 
1933 
Feb. 
1, 
1935 
Jan. 
1, 
1936 
Jan. 
1, 
1957 
Jan. 
1, 
1962 
July 
1, 
1963 
Nov. 
1, 
1964 
Dec. 
1, 
1965 
Savings deposits: 
12 months or more 3.00 2.50 2.50 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Less than 12 months 3.00 2.50 2.50 3.00 3.50 3,50 4.00 4.00 
Other time deposits:^  
12 months or more 3.00 2.50 2.50 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.50 5.50 
6 months to 12 months 3.00 2.50 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.50 
90 days to 6 months 3.00 2.50 2.00 2.50 2.50 4.00 4.50 5.50 
Less than 90 days 
(30-89 days) 3.00 2.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 5.50 
between July 1 and October 31, 1973 there was no ceiling for 4-year 
certificates with minimum denomination of $1,000. 
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Table 2.2, Regulation Q ceiling rates 1966-1973 
Rates July 20. 1966-June 30, 1973 
Effective date 
July 20, Sept. 26, Apr. 19, Jan. 21, 
Type of deposit 1966 1966 1968 1970 
Savings deposits 4.00 
Other time deposits:^  
Multiple maturity: 
30-89 days 4,00 
90 days to 1 year 
1 year to 2 years 5.00 
2 years or more 
Single maturity: 
Less than $100,000: 
30 days to 1 year 
1 year to 2 years 5.50 
2 years and over 
$100,000 or more: 
30-59 days 
60-89 days 
90-179 days 5.50 
180 days to 1 year 
1 year or more 
4.00 4.00 4.50 
4.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.50 
4.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.50 
5.75 
6.00 
6.25 
4.50 
5.00 
5.50 
5.75 
5.00 
5.50 
5.75 
6.25 
6.50 
6.75 
7.00 
7.50 
M^aximum rates on all single maturity time deposits in denominations 
of $100,000 or more have been suspended. Rates on time deposits whose 
maturity was less than 90 days were suspended June 24, 1970 and all other 
rates (maturity greater than 90 days) were suspended May 16, 1973. 
Distinction between single and multiple maturity deposits was eliminated 
July 16, 1973. 
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Table 2.3. Regulation Q ceiling rates beginning July 1, 1973 
Effective date 
Type of deposit July 1, 1973 Nov. 1, 1973 
Savings deposits 5.00 5.00 
Other time deposits (multiple- and 
single-maturity): 
Less than $100,000: 
30-89 days 5.00 5.00 
90 days to 1 year 5.50 5.50 
1 year to 2 1/2 years 6.00 6.00 
2 1/2 years or more 6.50 6.50 
4 years or more in minimum 
denomination of $1,000 1.00 7.25 
$100,000 or more 2.00 2.00 
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rate limitations only on savings deposits and on time deposits with 
maturities longer than 90 days, the Board continued to recognize the 
special thrift character of savings accounts and to preserve a differen­
tial between long term time deposits and short term time deposits repre­
senting essentially liquid balances" [2, 1959, p. 105]. 
With the exception of their views on time deposits with maturities 
under 90 days the Board of Governors from the late 1950's through the 
middle I960's shifted their use of Regulation Q as a means of preventing 
"destructive competition" to a means of promoting competition among banks. 
Regulation Q ceilings were adjusted upward each year from 1962 to 1966. 
Justification expressed by the Board of Governors for the January 1, 1962 
Regulation Q increase provided the foundation for the Board's position 
during the first half of the 1960's. The Board cited three reasons as to 
why the increase in Regulation Q ceilings would be beneficial; (1) the 
increase would enhance economic growth, (2) the increase would contribute 
to improving the U.S. balance of payments position, and (3) it would have 
a healthy effect on the management of individual banks. Growth was 
expected to result from the flow of bank funds to longer term assets. 
The Board believed that higher ceilings would "enable each member bank to 
determine the rates of interest it would pay in light of the conditions 
prevailing in its area, the type of competition it must meet, and its 
ability to pay" [2, 1961, p. 102], 
Regulation Q during the I960's also became known as a means of con­
trolling the growth of bank credit since the flow of deposits into banks 
is one factor influencing the ability of banks to expand loans and 
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investments [2, 1963, pp. 39-40]. By raising or lowering Regulation Q 
ceilings relative to market rates the Board of Governors realized it 
could influence the amount of time and savings deposits banks would be 
able to attract. 
In July 1966, less than 6 months after its last increase in "Q" 
ceiling limits, the Board shifted back to a more traditional use of "Q" 
ceilings, that is as a means of reducing competition. However at the 
same time the Board also sought to use "Q" as a means of controlling bank 
credit expansion. Severe competition had developed between commercial 
banks and other financial institutions following the December 1965 
increase in ceiling limits. Savings and loan associations suffered 
appreciable reductions in savings inflows as market rates increased and 
banks made use of the higher rates allowable on CD's to attract funds. 
In addition to the problems of rate competition between financial insti­
tutions, inflationary forces were present in the economy as a result of 
increased government expenditures largely associated with the Viet Nam 
War. 
The Board of Governors in July 1966 also recommended that legisla­
tion be passed to distinguish between consumer-type deposits and money 
market CD's. Included in the proposed legislation was the recommendation 
that Congress broaden the authority of the Federal Reserve by allowing 
them to distinguish deposits by amounts in regulating rates and that it 
extend similar authority to the Federal Home Loan Board to determine 
maximum rates at savings and loan associations [2, 1966, pp. 97-98]. 
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Congress concurred with the Board's recommendation and passed Public 
Law 89-597 in September 1966 giving the Board of Governors power to 
distinguish between deposits over and under $100,000 in establishing 
maximum rates for member banks. At the same time, the maximum rate on 
any time deposit under $100,000 (excluding passbook savings) was set at 
5 percent. Like the June reduction this action was intended to limit 
rate increases caused by competition for household savings and to keep 
the growth of bank credit at a moderate pace [2, 1966, pp. 104-106], 
During the remaining portion of 1966 market interest rates continued 
their upward trends of earlier months, and yields on prime 4 to 6 month 
commercial paper and 90 day U.S. Treasury bills exceeded maximum rates 
allowed under Regulation Q ceilings. At this time bankers saw their first 
real outflow of CD funds since the expanded use of CD's began in 1961. 
Bankers were not able to replace maturing CD's with new CD's and outstand­
ing CD's declined by nearly $4 billion. In addition a marked slowdown 
took place in the growth of other time deposits and a corresponding slow­
down in the growth of bank credit took place as well. Many banks were 
unable to meet loan requests of large corporations, many of whom were 
firms that had been doing business with a particular bank for years, and 
Wall Street coined another descriptive title "credit crunch." 
The Federal Reserve Board, hoping to offset a developing sluggishness 
in the economy, moved towards a position of monetary ease in early 1967. 
With monetary ease came a reduction in tightness in money market rates. 
Once again market rates were below Regulation Q ceilings and banks were 
able to compete for money market funds with CD's. Regulation Q ceilings 
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permitted banks to be competitive with money market instruments during 
the remainder of 1967 and through spring of 1968. At that time money 
market rates once again moved into the range above Regulation Q ceilings 
and banks were unable to compete as effectively as they did in previous 
periods. 
In April 1968, the Board raised ceilings on large denomination CD's 
in order to give banks "some leeway to compete for interest sensitive 
funds" [2, 1968, pp. 69-70], Market rates continued to climb through 
1968 and by the end of 1969 the spread between yields on four to six 
month commercial paper and the ceiling rate on 3 to 6 month CD's was 3 
full percentage points. The Board made no revisions in ceiling rates 
during 1969 and by the end of 1969 banks unable to renew maturing CD's 
lost over half of the $24 billion in CD's held in December 1968. Banks 
once again found themselves in a position of funds flowing out instead 
of in. Once again the Board of Governors sought to use Regulation Q as 
a means of controlling bank credit expansion along with Open Market 
policy. A continued high level of inflation was the Board's main justi­
fication for use of Regulation Q as a tool of constraint during 1969. 
Recognising the effects of the outflows of funds upon banks and the 
money market the Board of Governors revised Regulation Q ceilings upward 
on January 21, 1970. The ceiling of each maturity classification of 
large CD was raised 3/4 percent, and a new classification of CD, those 
maturing in one year or more, was permitted to yield 7.50 percent. 
Unsettled financial market conditions aggravated by the admission of 
the Penn Central Railroad that it was insolvent, lead the Board to suspend 
Regulation Q on CD's and other single maturity time deposits in 
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denominations of $100,000 and over with maturities of 30 to 89 days in 
early June 1970. The admission of the Penn Central Railroad that it 
would not be able to pay off maturing commercial paper raised havoc with 
the commercial paper market. The Board believed that removing Regulation 
Q ceilings on short term CD's would help banks meet the anticipated heavy 
demands for short term credit from .corporations unable to obtain funds 
from the issue of commercial paper [2, 1970, pp. 134-135]. 
Banks, in the early spring of 1973, were forced to rely upon CD 
issues with maturities of less than 90 days. Tight money market condi­
tions forced money market rates on 90 day or greater instruments above 
Regulation Q ceilings. The Board, offering the rationale that it wanted 
member banks to be able to maintain a balanced structure of deposits, 
suspended Regulation Q ceilings on CD's maturing in 90 days or more. 
This suspension ended the Board's use of Regulation Q as a means of con­
trolling bank's ability to compete for money market funds through the 
supply of CD's. 
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CHAPTER III. THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
The basic model used in this study was developed by Dudley Luckett 
[20] to provide a theoretical structure for the more stringent credit 
standards adopted by banks during periods of tight money, Carl VanderWilt 
[28] and Steve Steib [26] have also used this model to explain respec­
tively determinants of member bank borrowing from the Federal Reserve and 
Euro-dollar borrowings by U.S. banks. In each study a microeconomic 
portfolio optimization approach was used as the theoretical model in 
which to analyze bank behavior. 
The complete model used in this study seeks to analyze the behavior 
of individual banks as issuers of large CD's by combining a microeconomic 
analysis with a stock adjustment model using lagged variables, A geometric 
lag distribution can be expressed as: 
= a + - 1 + •••''%-„> + «t 
0 S X ^  1 (1) 
In this equation the effect of X on Y extends indefinitely into the 
past, however the coefficients of each of the X's decline in a fixed 
manner. Thus, the very distant values of X have very little effect upon 
the present Y, 
Equation 1 can be viewed in two ways — as an adaptive expecta­
tions model or as the partial adjustment or stock adjustment 
model. We shall use the stock adjustment model approach. In this 
* 
approach, a desired level of Y at time t, Y^  , is expressed as a function 
of one or more explanatory variables (X^ ) plus a disturbance term e^ ; i.e. 
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Yf* = a + (2) 
* 
Since the values of are not observable and hence cannot be measured, 
it is assumed that an attempt is made to match the actual level of Y to 
its desired level and that such an attempt is only partially successful. 
The relationship between Y^  and Y^  can be specified as: 
\ - 't-i " + s ") 
where 0 > y ^  1 and e^  is a random disturbance term. The coefficient y 
is called the "adjustment coefficient" as it indicates the rate of 
* 
adjustment of Y to Y , 
In this study Y becomes the volume of CD's outstanding and the X's 
become those variables affecting the volume of CD's. The following model 
of an individual bank is used to specify the appropriate "X's." 
A simplified balance sheet identity for an individual bank may be 
specified as: 
R + GS + L = DD + TD + CD + FF + BF + E$ (4) 
where : 
R = reserves 
GS = government securities 
L = loans 
DD = net demand deposits 
TD = time and savings deposits 
CD = certificate of deposit 
FF = federal funds 
BF = borrowings from the Federal Reserve 
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E$ = Eurodollar borrowings 
and R, GS, L, DD, TD, CD, BF Z 0; FF, E$ ^  0. 
If it is assumed that banks hold zero excess reserves, reserves may 
be expressed as: 
R = r^  (DD) + r^  (E$ - E$^ ) + r^  (TD + CD)^  (5) 
where : 
E$^  = the reserve-free Eurodollar borrowing base 
r^  = the reserve requirement on net demand deposits 
r^  = the reserve requirement on time and savings deposits 
r^  = the marginal reserve requirement on Eurodollar borrowing. 
By substituting 5 into 4 and simplifying: 
G + L = (1 - r^ ) DD + (1 - r2)(TD + CD) + (1 - r^ ) E$ 
+ r3E$j^  + FF + BF (6) 
The banker is assumed to manage his assets and liabilities in order to 
maximize the utility function, 
U = u(7T, S, A) (7) 
where ; 
TT = profit 
S = soundness 
A = liquidity 
T^his reserve equation is for the post July, 1969 period and will be 
used throughout the development of this theoretical model. 
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Profit 
Profits equal total revenue minus total costs. Total revenue may 
be written as: 
TR = iggGS + i^ L + 5^ DD (8) 
where : 
TR = total revenue 
l_g = the interest rate on government securities Gd 
i^  = the interest rate on loans 
6^  = the service charge rate on demand deposits 
Total costs may be written as: 
TC = ôgDD + i^ jjTD + i^ pCD + ip^ FF + ig^ BF + + K (9) 
where : 
TC = total costs 
62 = the cost of servicing demand deposits 
i^ jj = the interest rate paid on time and savings deposits 
içjj = the interest rate paid on certificates of deposit 
i„„ = the interest rate paid on federal funds 
rr 
igp = the interest rate paid on Federal Reserve borrowings 
i . = the interest rate paid on Eurodollar borrowings 
E? 
K = fixed costs including the cost of servicing loans 
By assuming that the cost of servicing demand deposits is equal to 
the service charge on demand deposits (i.e., 6^  ^ = ôg) profits can be 
expressed as : 
" = + 'L'' - 4D™ - 'cD™ - - V" - • K 
(10) 
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Liquidity 
The banker's concern with liquidity is centered on his desire to 
meet obligations which will come due between the current period and his 
planning horizon, t + h. These obligations include deposit withdrawals, 
2 
redemption of maturing certificates of deposit, loan requests , repayments 
of borrowings from the Federal Reserve, repayment of matured federal funds 
borrowings, and repayment of matured Eurodollar borrowings. 
At time t the banker is certain about the amount of his borrowings 
from the Federal Reserve, federal funds borrowings, and Eurodollar 
borrowings which will come due between t and t + h. Future levels of 
loan requests and deposit withdrawals are unknown and accordingly the 
banker must form expectations of their respective changes during his plan­
ning horizon. Maturing obligations constitute uses of funds for the 
banker and are another source of his concern with liquidity. 
Sources of funds available to the banker include government security 
liquidation, matured loan collection, sales (issues) of certificates of 
deposits, new borrowings from the Federal Reserve, increases in deposits, 
new Eurodollar borrowings and those reserves freed by deposit withdrawals. 
The banker. If loan default is ignored, knows with certainty the portion 
of his loan portfolio which will be repaid during the planning horizon. 
However, he must form subjective expectations about the levels of federal 
2 In any time period a banker faces a loan demand schedule and in this 
model loan requests are assumed to be those requests the banker chooses to 
meet. For a discussion of the customer relationship and the banker's 
decision to deny or meet loan requests, see [15, pp. 154-158]. 
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fund borrowings, deposits, certificates of deposit, borrowings from the 
Federal Reserve and Eurodollar borrowings which will exist at t + ho 
While the banker does have some control over these levels his expectations 
will be influenced by his expectations of various interest rates and the 
rules and regulations of the regulatory agencies. For example, the 
difference between ceiling rates on CD's and the treasury bill rate will 
affect the banker's expectations regarding his ability to issue new CD's 
between t and t + h, and thus the expected level of CD holdings at t + h. 
We shall base our definition of bank liquidity on the difference 
between sources and uses of funds. Liquidity then is defined as follows: 
GS^  - a^ CD^  + E6CD - a^ BF^  + EABF - a^ FF^  + E6FF - a^ (l-r2)E$ 
+ E(1 - r_)AE$ + a^ L^  - EÛL - Ea^ (l - r^ )ADD + E(1 - r^ )6DD 
- Eay(l - rgjTD^  + E(1 - rgjATD + E(1 - r2)ATD - ACT = 0 (11) 
which may be written as: 
GS^  - a^ L^  + E[ACD + ABF + AFF + (1 - r2)AE$ + (1 - r^ A^DD 
+ (1 - r2)ATD - ag(l - r^ )DD^  - a^ (l - - AL] - a^ CD^  
- a^BF^ - agFF - a^(l - - Acr = 0 (12) 
where : 
E = expected value operator 
A = change in the level of the indicated variable between 
t and t + h 
= proportion of certificates of deposit holdings at t which 
will be redeemed between t and t + h 
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= proportion of federal funds borrowings at t which will be 
repaid between t and t + h 
Bg = proportion of borrowings from the Federal Reserve at t 
which will be repaid between t and t + h 
a^  = proportion of Eurodollar borrowings at t which will be 
repaid between t and t + h 
a^  = proportion of loans at t which will be collected between 
t and t + h 
ag = proportion of demand deposits at t which will be withdrawn 
between t and t + h 
ay = proportion of time and savings deposits at t which will 
be withdrawn between t and t + h 
0 = the standard deviation of the distribution of (ACD + ABF 
+ ÛFF + (1 - rg)6E$ + (1 - r^ )ADD + (1 - r2)6TD 
- ag(l - rj)DD^  - a^ d - r2)TD^  - AL) 
A = measure of liquidity 
If we assume that the distribution of changes in all sources and uses 
of funds combined is distributed with a known mean and standard deviation, 
then A is the only unknown in 12. This value A, becomes the number of 
standard deviations by which E(6CD + ABF + 6FF + (1 - r2)AE$ + (1 - r^ ) 
ADD + (1 - rglATD - a^ fl - r^ ) DD^  - a^ Cl - r^ ) SD^  - 6L) may fall below 
the actual level without causing the banker to be unable to meet his needs 
for liquid funds. 
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Example 
Suppose it is known that a banker expects from t to t + h, to issue 
$1,000 in new CD's, borrow $500 from the Federal Reserve, borrow $1,000 
in Federal Funds, borrow $1,000 in the Eurodollar market, accept $700 in 
demand deposits, accept $200 in time and savings deposits, and meet 
$1,200 worth of new loan demand. 
Further assume that, between t and t + h, 30 percent of his CD hold­
ings at t will mature (a^  = .30), all of his borrowings from the Federal 
Reserve at t must be repaid {a.2 = 1) , all of his Federal Funds at t must 
be repaid (a^  = 1), 40 percent of his Eurodollar borrowings at t will 
mature (a^  = .40) , and 25 percent of his loan portfolio at t will mature 
(a^  = .25). In addition suppose the banker expects 10 percent of his 
demand deposits to be withdrawn between t and t + h, and 7 percent of his 
savings and time deposits are expected to be withdrawn (a^  = .10 and 
ay = .07). 
If the standard deviation of E[6CD + 6BF + 6FF + (1 - r2)6E$ 
+ (1 - r^ )ADD + (1 - r2)6TD - a^ (l - r^ )DD^  - a^ Cl - rg^ ID^  - 6L] were 
known, a measure of the banker's liquidity could be obtained from his 
current portfolio (at t). The following values constitute one possible 
example : 
Current Portfolio Expected Changes 
CDj. = 3000 = .30 E( CD) = -.30 (3000) + 1000 = 100 
FF^  = 600 a^  = 1.0 E( FF) = -1.0 (600) + 1000 = 400 
BF^  = 200 a_ = 1.0 E( BF) = -1.0 (200) + 500 = 300 
E$^  = 1500 a^  = .40 E( E$) = -.40 (1500) + 1000 = 400 
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Lj. = 6000 E(a^) = .25 
DD^ = 4000 E(ag) = .10 
TD^ = 1000 E(a^) = ,07 
E( L) = -.25 (6000) + 1200 = -300 
E( DD) = -.10 (4000) + 700 = 300 
E( TD) = -.07 (1000) + 200 = 130 
G 
t 500 
In this example the solution of Equation 12 yields ACT = $3200. If 
we assume o = $3200, then A •» 1. If the distribution is normally dis­
tributed the banker has adjusted his portfolio in a manner which assures 
him of being able to meet his liquidity needs 84 percent of the time. If 
the standard deviation were $1600, A would be 2. In this case the banker 
would be assured of meeting his liquidity needs 98 percent of the time, 
given the assumption of a normal distribution. 
Sounurtcss serves as a measure of the bank's ability to withstand 
unexpected declines in its liabilities and unexpected declines in the 
value of its assets. It is a measure of the bank's ability to meet its 
obligations to its customers in the event of forced liquidation due to 
unexpected events such as local or national economic contraction. 
The Federal Reserve's Form for analyzing bank capital (which is used 
to evaluate the bank's capital adequacy under assumed conditions of dis­
tress) provides the basis for the definition of soundness used here. This 
definition is expressed as the difference between the realizable value of 
the bank's assets in potential periods of contraction with an assumed 
maximum decline in liabilities which would accompany such a contraction. 
Soundness 
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St = + =3^  - =4CD, - s^ TD; - s^ DD^  - BF^  
- FF^  - E$j. (13) 
where ; 
= measure of soundness 
Sg = percentage of the current value of the bank's present 
holdings of government securities which would be realizable 
under assumed conditions of distress 
Sg = percentage of the current value of the bank's present 
holdings of loans which would be realizable under the 
assumed conditions of distress 
s^  = percentage by which the bank's current liabilities might 
decline, through attrition, under the assumed conditions 
of distress 
s^  = percentage by which the bank's current time and savings 
deposits might decline under the assumed conditions of 
distress 
Sg = percentage by which the bank's current demand deposits 
might decline under the assumed conditions of distress 
Since R is a linear function of DD, TD + CD, and E$ - E$^ , a weight (s^ ) 
can be defined such that: 
s^ R = Sgr^ (DD) + s^ r^ TD + s^ rgCD + r^ fE# - E$^ ) (14) 
and the substitution of 14 into 13 simplifies to: 
St = SgG + s^ L - Sg(l - r^ )DD - 8^ (1 - r2(TD - s^ (l - rgjCD 
- (1 - r3)E$ - r^ ES^  - BF - FF (15) 
which is the algebraic specification of soundness to be used in this study. 
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Derivation of Desired CD Level 
Having specified utility maximization model of bank behavior in 
which certificates of deposit enter the utility function through their 
effects on profits, soundness, and liquidity, the desired or equilibrium 
levels of CD's now need to be derived. The individual bank is viewed as 
having five alternative methods of acquiring needed reserves; liquidation 
of government securities, selling CD's, purchasing Federal Funds, borrow­
ing from the Federal Reserve, and borrowing Eurodollars. 
The banker is assumed to possess perfect knowledge with respect to 
Federal Reserve reserve requirements and it is further assumed that the 
bank's reserve needs may arise from increases in loan demand greater than 
existing funds, withdrawals of demand deposits and withdrawals of time and 
savings deposits, including maturing CD's which are not replaced. 
Differential calculus is used to derive those variables which the banker 
considers relevant to issuing CD's when faced with reserve needs and the 
assumed means of adjustment. 
The total derivative of the utility function specifies the changes 
in utility for a given change in one or all of the variables. The total 
derivative of this model's utility function may be expressed as: 
du = ôu/ôiT dTT + ôu/ôS dS + 9u/ôA dA (16) 
Since K is constant drr (total derivative of profit) becomes: 
drr = ôtt/ôGS dGS + ôtt/ôL dL + Ôtt/ôTD dTD + ân/ôCD 
+ Bn/ÔBF dBF + èTr/âE$ dE$ (17) 
The total derivative of soundness is: 
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dS = ÔS/ÔDD dDD + ÔS/âTD dTD + ôS/ôCD dCD + ôE$/ôE$ dE$ 
+ as/àE$ dE$ + as/acs dcs + as/asF BE + as/app dPF (I8) 
By assuming a constant, E[6CD + 6BF + àFE + (1 - rg)6E$ + (1 - 12)600 
+ (1 - r2)6TD - a^ (l - r^ )DD^  - a^ (l - constant, and the 
maturity structure of the banker's portfolio constant (a^ , ag, a^ , a^  and 
a^  constant) the total derivative of liquidity reduces to: 
dA = BA/ôGS dGS + ôA/SCD dCD + ôA/ôBF dBF + ôA/ôFF dFF 
+ aA/ôE$ dE$ (19) 
The partial derivatives of Equations 17, 18 and 19 may be evaluated 
using Equations 10, 12, and 15» The results are: 
diT = iggdGS + i^ dL - i^ jjdTD - ippdFF - igpdBF - ig^ dE$ (20) 
dS = SgdGS + s^ dL - Sg(l - r^ )dDD - sy(l - r2)dTD 
- s^ (l - r2)dCD - (1 - rgjdES - r^ dES^  - dBF - dFF (21) 
dA = I/o- (dGS + a^ dL - a^ dCD - a^ dFF - a^ dBF - a^ dE$) (22) 
Then substituting Equations 20, 21 and 22 into the utility function. 
Equation 16 results in: 
dU = au/an [iggdCS + i^ dL - i^ jjdTD - iggdCD - i^ d^PF - i^ d^BF 
- ig^ dE$] + au/aSCagdGS + a^ dL - a^ (l - r2)dDD - a^ (l - r2) 
dTD - a^ (l - r2)dCD - (1 - r2)dE$ - r2dE$^  - dBF - dFF] 
+ au/aA 1/ofdGS + s^ dL - s^ dCD - SgdFF - s^ dBF - s^ dE$] (23) 
Factoring Equation 23 yields the total derivative of the utility function 
in the following terms: 
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du = dGS[(9u/ôTr igg + èu/ôS Sg + ôu/^ A l/a) + dLOu/ôn 
+ au/as S3 + ôu/ôA 1/ct ag) - dTD(au/an l^ D + Bu/as Sg(l - rg)] 
- dCD[au/âTr igg + ôu/SS s^ (l - r^ ) + ôu/SA a^ ] 
- dDD[au/aS Sg(l - r^)] - dE$[au/an ig$ + au/as (1 - r^) 
+ au/aA 1/CT a^] - dE$(au/aS r^) - dFFCau/arr ipp 
+ au/as + au/aA l/^ a^) - dBFCau/arr îgp + au/aA l/a a^) (24) 
* 
Desired levels of CD issues, CD , are those levels which provide the 
banker maximum utility under the constraints imposed by the bank's account­
ing balance sheet. Thus the necessary (first order) condition for utility 
maximization is that dU = 0 for all possible variations in the bank's 
accounting balance sheet, Equation 4. All possible variations in the 
balance sheet identity may be expressed as: 
dGS + dL = (1 - rj)dDD + (1 - r2)dTD + (1 - r2)dCD 
+ (1 - r3)dE$ + dFF + dBF (25) 
Solving Equation 25 for dCD yields: 
dCD = (1/1 - r2)[dGS + dL - (1 - rj)dDD - (1 - r2)dTD 
- (1 - 13)6:$ - r3dE$^  - dFF - dBF] (26) 
Substituting Equation 26 into Equation 24 imposes the conditions of 
the balance sheet and yields: 
du = dGS (au/an igg + au/as 82 + au/aA i/g) + dL(au/aTT i^  
+ au/as S3 + au/aA i/o- a^ ) - dTD[au/aTT i^  ^+ au/as sy(i - rg)] 
- dDD[au/aS Sg(l - r^ )] - dE$[au/an ig^  + au/as (1 - rg) 
+ au/aA l/a a^ ] - dF [au/arr ipp + au/aS + au/aA l/aag) 
49 
- dE$Ou/ôS r^ ) - dBFfôu/ôrr igp + ôu/ôS + ôu/?A l/a a^ ) 
- 1/(1 - r^ ) [dGS + dL - (1 - r^ )dDD - (1 - r2)dID 
- (1 - r3)dE$ - - dFF - dBF] (âu/ôn 
+ au/as s^ (l - Tg) + ôu/âA l/a a^ ) (27) 
Factoring and simplifying Equation 27 results in: 
dU = dGS[ôu/ân igg - i^ jj/d - r^ ) + âu/ôS (s^  - s^ ) + ôu/ôA l/a 
(1 - a^ )(l - rg)] + dL[ôu/âTT (i^  - + ôu/âS 
(Sg - s^ ) + âu/ôA l/a (a^  - a^ /1 - rg)] - dTD[au/&n 
(i^ D " ^ CD (s^  - s^ )(l - r^ ) + ôu/ôA l/a - a^ ] 
- dDD[ôu/ân (igQ (1 - r^ ) + ôu/ôS (1 - r^ )(s^  - s^ ) 
- âu/ôA l/a (1 - r^ )/(l - r^ ) a^ ] - dE$[au/3rr (igg - i^g) 
(1 - - rg) + ôu/ôS (1 - r2)(l - s^) + ôu/ôA l/a 
(a^  - a^ )(l - r2)/(l - r^ )"] - dE$j^ [ôu/ÔTT i^ r^^ /d - r^ ) 
- âu/ôS 12(1 + s^ ) - ôu/ôA l/a r^a^/d - rg)] 
- dFF[ôu/ôTT (ipp - igo/l - r^) + Bu/a S (1 - s^ ) + Bu/BA l/a 
(a^  - a^ /1 - rg)] - dBF[ôu/ôTT (ig^  - ig^ /l - r^ ) 
+ ôu/ôS (1 - s^ ) + Bu/ôA l/a (a^  - a^ /1 - rg)] (28) 
Equation 28 is the total derivative of the utility function under the 
conditions of the balance sheet identity. The first order conditions of 
utility maximization, or portfolio equilibrium, specify that dU = 0 for 
all variations in the independent variables and thus require that: 
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âu/ÔTT (Igg - iQg/l - r^ ) + âu/ôS (Sg - s^ ) + 3u/9A l/<j 
(1 - a^ /l - r) = 0 (29) 
Ôu/ÔTT (i^  - igo/l - Fg) + Bu/as (s^  - s^ ) + Ôu/ÔA 1/a 
(a^ - a^/1 - Tg) = 0 (30) 
àu/ÔTT (i j^j - içjj) + ôu/ôS (s^  - s^ )(l - r^ ) 
+ Ôu/ÔA 1/ct - a^ = G (31) 
Ôu/ÔTT (igQ (1 - r^ )/l - - ôu/ôS (1 - r^ )(8g - s^ ) 
+ 5u/ôA 1/cr (1 - r^)/l - = 0 (32) 
Ôu/ÔTT [igg - ig^ Cl - • r^ ) + au/as (1 - s^ )(l - r^ ) 
+ Ôu/âA I/o- (a^  - aj^ )(l - r3)/(l - i^ )] = 0 (33) 
-ôu/aTT (igpTg/i - Tg) - au/as r^d + s^) - au/aA i/a 
^3 ^i^l - r2 = 0 (34) 
àu/aiT (igp - icij/l - r^) + au/as (1 - s^) + au/aA l/a 
(a^  - a^ /1 - Tg) =0 (35) 
and that : 
au/arr (igp - igg/l - r^ ) + au/âS (1 - s^ ) + au/aA l/a 
(a^  - a^ /1 - Tg) =0 (36) 
The above first order conditions are the general equilibrium condi­
tions for a bank's portfolio as specified by our model. The purpose of 
this paper is to determine those variables considered by the banker in 
issuing CD's when faced with a need for reserves as a result of a loan 
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demand greater than existing funds, withdrawal of time and savings 
deposits, or withdrawal of demand deposits—with the restriction that his 
alternative sources of funds are limited to liquidation of government 
securities, selling certificates of deposit, purchasing Federal Funds, 
borrowing from the Federal Reserve, and borrowing Eurodollars. 
The equilibrium conditions implied by the model are derived for the 
choices of Issuing CD's and liquidation of government securities, issuing 
CD's and borrowing Eurodollars, issuing CD's and purchasing Federal Funds, 
and issuing CD's and borrowing from the Federal Reserve. 
If the banker experiences demand deposit withdrawals and uses Issues 
of CD's and government securities to regain portfolio equilibrium, the 
balance sheet identity (25) requires that (1 - r2)dCD - dGS = - (1 - r^ ) 
dDD. This returns the banker's portfolio to equilibrium with zero 
excess reserves. 
By using the total derivatives of the utility function (24) and the 
necessary conditions of utility maximization a relationship among the 
respective variables can be derived under the assumption that CD issues 
and government security sales are the only available sources of funds. 
The total derivative of the utility function can be expressed as: 
dU = dGS[9U/9n igg + ôU/ôS + 9U/9A l/cr] - dCD[âU/ÔTr Igp 
+ ÔU/ÔS s^ (l - rg) + ÔU/âA I / o  a^ ] - dDD âU/ôS Sg(l - r^ ) 
(37) 
and since (1 - r2)dCD - dGS = (1 - r^ )dDD or dDD = 
- (1 - r2)/(l - r^ ) dCD - dGS/1 - r^  
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du = dGS[ôu/airT i^ g  + ôu/ôS s + ôu/ôA 1/cr] - dCD[au/an 
+ au/as s^ d - rg) + ôu/ôA 1/ct a^ ] + [(1 - r2)dCD - dGS] 
[Su/âS (38) 
Equation 38 reduces to: 
du = dGS[ôu/ôrr i^ g  + ôu/ôS (s^  - Sg) + ôu/ôA 1/a ] 
- dCD[5u/9rr i^  ^+ ôu/ôS (1 - i'2)(s^  - Sg) 
+ ôu/ôA 1/CT a^ ] (39) 
First order conditions require that: 
âu/ôn igg + âu/ôS (Sg - Sg) + ôu/ôA 1/CT = 0 (40) 
âu/ân igg + ôu/ôS (1 - r2)(8^  - Sg) + ôu/ôA l/a = 0 (41) 
Which can be restated as: 
ôu/ôn igg + au/as (Sg - Sg) + âu/ôA l/j = 9u/ôrr i^ g 
+ âu/ôS (1 - 1^ 2^  ^ ®4 "  ^9u/aA 1/CT (42) 
ôu/Sn (igg - igg) + au/asCsg + (s^  - Sg)(l - rg)] 
+ ôu/èA 1/CT (1 - a^ ) = 0 (43) 
With the assumption that Eurodollar borrowings and sales of CD's 
are the only available sources of funds by which a banker may adjust to 
a demand deposit withdrawal the adjustment that the banker must make is: 
(1 - r^ )dE$ + (1 - Tg) dCD = - (1 - r^ )dDD. 
The total derivative of the utility function (24) now becomes: 
dU = -dCD[ôu/an igg + ôu/as (s^ )(l - rg) + au/àA 1/CT a^ ] - dE$ 
[au/an ig^  + au/as (1 - r^ ) + au/aA l/a a^ ] - dDD 
[au/as Sg (1 - rj)] (44) 
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Given that (1 - r2)dE$ + (1 - rgjdCD = - (1 - r)dDD Equation 44 now 
becomes : 
dU = -dCD[ôu/9tt i^  ^+ âu/âS s^ (l - r^ ) + 9u/ôA 1/ct a^ ] 
- dE$[ôu/ÔTT ig^  + ôu/3S (1 - Cg) + âu/ôA 1/a a^ ] 
+ [(1 - r3)dE$ + (1 - r2)dCD]0u/ôS Sg) (45) 
Equation 45 can then be reduced to: 
dU = -dCD[âu/ôTr ig^  + 5u/ôS (1 -  ^âu/ôA 1/a a^ ] 
- dE$Côu/ôn ig^  +âu/5S (1 - r3)(l - s^ ) ôu/ôA 1/a a^ ] (46) 
The first order conditions are: 
ôu/ôn igg + ôu/ôS (1 - 1^2) (s^ - Sg) + ôu/ôA 1/cr a^ = 0 (47) 
Ôu/ÔTT ig^  + ôu/ôS (1 - r2)(l - Sg) + ôu/ôA 1/a a^  = 0 (48) 
Combining 47 and 48 produces: 
ôu/èîT igg + âu/ôS (1 - ï"2)(s^  - Sg) + ôu/âA 1/cr a^  
= Bu/ôtt igç + âu/ôS (1 - r^ Xl - s^ ) + ôu/^ A l/a a^  (49) 
which may also be expressed as: 
Ôu/ÔTT (igg - igg) + ôu/ôS (1 - s^ ) + ^ (^Sg - 1) + ^ 2(3^  - Sg) 
+ ôu/ôA 1/a (a^  - a^ ) = 0 (50) 
If the banker is allowed to choose only between Federal Reserve Borrowings 
and CD issues when adjusting to demand deposit withdrawals he must make the 
portfolio adjustment so that (1 - r2)dCD + dBF = - (1 - r^ )dDD. 
In this case the total derivative of the utility function is expressed 
as : 
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du = -dBF[9u/ôn igj, + 9u/ôS + ôu/3A 1/a a^] - dCD[ôu/ôn 
+ au/as s^ (l - r^ ) + Ôu/ÔA 1/CT a^ ] - dDD 
[ôu/ôS - Sg (1 - r^ )] (51) 
Substituting (1 - r2)dCD + dBF = - (1 - r^ )dDD into equation 51 yields: 
du = -dBF[ôu/ân ig^  + ôu/ôS + ôu/ôA 1/a a^ ] 
- -dCD[ôu/ÔTT igg + au/as s^d - r^) + au/aA 1/a a^] 
+ [(1 - r2)dCD + dBF] (âu/aS Sg) (52) 
Equation 52 reduced to: 
dU = -dBF[au/arr ig^  + au/aS (1 - Sg) + au/aA l/a a^ ] 
- dCD[au/an igg + au/as (1 - r2)(s^  - Sg) + au/aA l/a 8]^ ] 
(53) 
The first order conditions are; 
au/an igp + au/as (1 - Sg) + au/aA = o (54) 
au/an igg + au/as (1 - r2)(s^ - Sg) + au/aA l/a a^ = 0 (55) 
Equation 54 and 55 may also be written: 
au/5n igp + au/as (i - Sg) + au/aA i/a a^ = au/an i^jj 
+ au/aS (1 - 1^2) (s^ - Sg) + au/aA l/a a^ (56) 
which can also be written as : 
au/an(igp - i^jj) +au/as[(l - Sg) - (1 - r2)(s^ - Sg)] 
+ au/aA 1/a (a^ - a^) =0 (57) 
55 
In the situation where CD issues and purchases of Federal Funds are 
the only source of funds available to the banker, he must adjust to 
demand deposit withdrawals so that (1 - r2)dCD + dFF = - (1 - r^ d^DD. 
With these conditions the total derivative of the utility function 
is : 
Substituting (1 - r2)dCD + dFF = - (1 - r^ ) dDD in Equation 58 yields: 
dU = -dFF[ôu/ôn i^  ^+ âu/ôS + ôu/ôA 1/CT a^ ] - dCD[au/ôTT i^  ^
+ ôu/ôS (s^ )(l - r^ ) + 9u/ôA 1/ct a^ ] + [(1 - r2)dCD + 
dU = -dFF[Su/ôTT ipp + ôu/ôS + âu/ôA l/cr a^ ] - dCD[ôu/ôTT i^  ^
+ âu/ôS s^ (l - rg) + ôu/ôA 1/CT a^ ] - dDD[âu/dS s^  
(1 - r^ )] (58) 
dFF[ôu/BS ag] (59) 
Equation 59 simplifies to: 
dU = dF[ôu/ôTT ipp + ôu/ôS (1 - Sg) + âu/ôA 1/ct a^] 
- dCD[âu/ôTr i^  ^+ ôu/ôS (1 - r^ ) (s^  - Sg) 
+ ôu/ôa 1/ct a^] (60) 
The first order conditions are then: 
ôu/ôtt ipp + ôu/âS (1 - sg) + ôu/ôA 1/ct a^) = 0 
ôu/9tt igg + âu/ôS (I - r2)(s^  - sg) + ôu/ôA 1/ct a^  = 0 
(61) 
(62) 
which as in earlier procedures may be expressed as: 
Ôu/ôtt (ipp - i^ jj) + ôu/ôS [(1 + Tg) s^  + (1 + i^ Sg)] 
+ ôu/ôa 1/ct (a2 - a^) 0 (63) 
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In equations 43, 50, 57 and 63 the variables a banker must consider 
in establishing his behavior as a CD issuer when faced with demand 
deposit withdrawals are considered. 
In these equations the banker is placed in the position of choosing 
among combinations of CD sales. Eurodollar borrowings. Federal Funds 
purchases, borrowing from the Federal Reserve, and government securities 
sales as sources of funds. 
The same technique is used to determine those variables which are of 
interest to the banker in developing his behavior as a CD issuer when 
experiencing withdrawals of time and savings deposits. 
When a banker chooses a combination of government securities sales 
and CD issues as a source of funds he must satisfy (1 - r2)dCD - dGS = 
- (1 - r2)dTD. 
By substitution and simplification the first order conditions, under 
the balance sheet identityj are derived to be: 
âu/ôTT [i^ jj - igg - igg + 2^ 
(s^  - Sg)] + ôu/ôA I/o- (aj^  - 1) = 0 (64) 
If the banker chooses between Eurodollars and CD's as alternative 
sources of funds, the balance sheet identity requires that (1 - rg)dE$ 
+ (1 - r2)dCD = - (1 - r2)dTD. 
The first order conditions with this constraint are: 
âu/ôTT [igg " ipp (1 " fg/l " ^ 2^  ^  ^FF " ^ CD^  ^  ôu/5S 
[(1 - r^ ) + (r^  - rg) + (r2 - D] + ôu/âA 1/cr 
(a^  - a^ ) =0 (65) 
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If the banker chooses between borrowing from the Federal Reserve and 
issuing CD's as alternative sources of funds, the balance sheet identity 
requires that (1 - r2)dCD + dBF = - (1 - r2)dTD. 
With this constraint the first order conditions become: 
Ôu/ÔTT [igp - igg + - ÎTo/l - rg] + ôu/ôS [(1 - s^ ) 
- (s^  - s^ )(l - rg)] + ôu/ôA 1/CT (a^  - a^ ) = 0 (66) 
If the banker chooses between Federal Funds and CD's to meet time and 
savings deposit withdrawals the balance sheet identity requires that 
(1 - r2)dCD + dFF = - (1 - r2)dTD. 
Under this constraint the first order conditions reduce to: 
ÔU/ÔTT [ipp - ijjj/1 - ^ 2 + igiQ - icg] + ôu/3S [1 - s^ (l - r2) 
- r^ Sg] + ôu/ôA 1/a (a2 - a^ ) = 0 (67 
Equations 64, 65, 66 and 67 provide the variables a banker considers 
in bringing his portfolio back to equilibrium when it has been placed in 
disequilibrium as a result of a decline in time and savings deposits. 
The variables involved in the banker's decisions regarding his 
behavior as a CD issuer shall now be derived under the assumption that 
his need for reserves is a result of increased loan demand. The method­
ology is the same as that used in equations 37 through 67. 
If the banker decides to make the necessary portfolio adjustments 
by issuing CD's and selling government securities the balance sheet con­
straint is that (1 - r2)dCD - dGS = dL. 
The first order conditions derived from Equation 24 may be expressed 
as : 
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ôu/ôn [Igs - icD " [Sg - + r^ Cs^  - S3)] 
+ ôu/âA 1/ct (a^  - a^  Zg - 1) = 0 (68) 
If the banker considers Eurodollar borrowings and CD's to meet 
increased loan demand the balance sheet identity constraint is that 
(1 - r2)dCD + (1 - r3)dE$ = dL. 
The first order conditions in this case are simplified to: 
âu/ôn [ig$ " ^ 2^  ^
+ 9u/9S [1 - 83(1 - r^ ) - (s^  - S3)(l - r^ )! + 9u/ôA I/o-
[a^  - - a^  (r^  - r^ )] = 0 (69) 
If the banker decides to adjust his portfolio through CD sales and 
borrowing from the Federal Reserve the balance sheet identity constraint 
is that (1 - r2)dCD + dBF = dL. 
The first order conditions are then: 
ôu/ôn (igp " 2^ " ^ CD^  âu/ôS ((s^  - S3) r^  - s^ ) 
+ âu/âA 1/cr rg a^ = 0 (70) 
When the banker adjusts to increased loan demand by selling CD's 
and purchasing Federal Funds the balance sheet identity requires that 
(1 - r2)dCD + dFF = dL. 
The first order conditions then become: 
Ôu/Ôn [ipp " '2 " icD^  &U/&S (Sgfg + 1 - s^ ) 
+ Bu/gA l/a (33 - a^ - r^a^) = 0 (71) 
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In summary, Equations 43, 50, 57, 63 through 71 contain the vari­
ables with which the banker is concerned when determining his desired 
level of CD's. The situations under which these variables were derived 
are demand deposit withdrawals, time and savings deposit withdrawals, 
and increased loan demand. The derived variables are: 
3^' ^ 2' " ^ CD^ ' ' 
" ^ CD^ ' ' ^GS' ^ CD " ^ 2^ ' 
^^ E$ ' ^FF^  ^" ^ 3/^  ' ^2^  F^F " ^ CD^ ' ^ B^F " ^ CD 
i^ D^ l " ^ 2^ ' [^ FF " 2^ ^  ^TD " ^ CD^ ' 
[^ GS " C^D " 2^^ ' [^ %F " 2^ " ^ CD^ ' '•^ FF 2^ C^D^ ' 
ôu/â-rr, ôu/ôS, 9u/9A. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
In this chapter we shall present the econometric models which shall 
be used to examine the CD supply function derived from the theoretical 
model of Chapter III, The presence of multicollinearity among many of 
the variables leads to the elimination of the following variables from 
the CD supply function: 
^^ TD " G^S ' ^CD \D^  ^" ^ 2^ ' ^ E^$ " " ^ 3^  ^" ^ 2^  
F^F " ^ CD^ ' (^ %F ~ C^D T^D ~ 4:0^  ^' ^2^ ' 
(^ TF ' ^TD^  ^" ^ 2 S:D " ^ CD^ ' " ^ CD ' 2^^ ' 
^^ BF 2^ C^D^  (*TF ' 2^ ' ^CD^ * 
Regulation Q ceilings impact upon CD offer rates whenever short-term 
money market rates rise above existing regulation Q ceilings and the use 
of Regulation Q by the Federal Reserve System as a means of controlling 
CD volume was discussed in Chapter II. A proxy for the effect of the 
presence of Regulation Q ceilings is included in our econometric analysis. 
This proxy is the difference between secondary market CD rates and the 
Regulation Q celling. 
Since bankers' desires to issue CD's are commonly believed to be 
influenced by the strength of loan demand, the variable total loans is 
also included in our econometric analysis. This variable is consistent 
with the assumption of our theoretical model (page 40) that loan requests 
are those requests the banker chooses to meet. 
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Assuming linear relationships between CD volume and the dependent 
variables we obtain the following equation for CD supply: 
'^^ t  ^^ 0 " ^ CD^  " ^ CD^  S^^ CDS " 
• ^CD^  " ^ CD^  6^^ 3^^  
+ byCfg) + bgL + (1 - k) CD^  ^  + Ij. 
where: b^ , b^ , b^ , b^ , b^ , b^ , bg, (1 - X) are assumed to be > 0 and 
b^ , b^  < 0. 
To eliminate the effects of multicollinearity among the interest rate 
differentials we shall estimate an equation in which one variable repre­
senting the summation of the individual interest rate differentials is 
substituted for the individual interest rate differentials. This equation 
becomes : 
CDt = b/ + bs'CicDs - «« + "e'C's) + bf'frz) 
+ (1 -  X)'(CDj_j)  + bg'L + bj'(Z) + Ij.  
where : 
Z = [(tj.B " ^ cD^  " ^ CD^  " ^ CD^  S^F ' ^CD^  ^
and bp', b^ ', bg', bg , (1 - X)' are assumed to be > 0 
and bg', b^  < 0. 
Interest rate differentials are assumed positive since an increase 
in the differential implies a decrease in the cost of CD's relative to 
the cost of other instruments. The coefficient on the reserve requirement 
on the time and savings deposit reserve requirement ratio (which includes 
CD's) is assumed negative while the coefficient on the Eurodollar borrow­
ing reserve requirement is expected to be positive. An increase in the 
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Eurodollar reserve requirement increases the size of the adjustment 
required to regain balance following a given change in Eurodollar borrow­
ings; while an increase in the time and savings deposit reserve requirement 
increases the effective cost of using CD's as an adjustment vehicle. 
The existence of a simultaneous determination of CD issues and CD 
rates requires us to consider the use of two stage least squares tech­
niques. To use these techniques we must specify a demand function. 
In developing a demand function for CD's it is assumed that the 
supply of CD deposits is very elastic with respect to interest rates. 
Furthermore, investors are concerned with the interest rate differential 
between money market instruments. Wealth is considered an important 
variable; CD growth requires an increase in the amount of available funds. 
The supply function is: 
CD - OfQ + (^ cP " ^ CD^  " ^ CD^  t^ 
where 
igp = the commercial paper rate on one to four month commercial 
paper 
PI = U.S. Personal Income, a proxy for wealth. 
Interest rate differentials are assumed to be inversely related to 
the supply of CD deposits. 
Investors are assumed to seek higher rates of return among money 
market instruments of the same maturity. The supply of CD deposits is 
assumed to be positively related to personal income. 
s d Assumed equilibrium, CD = CD , the reduced form equation becomes: 
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C^D = @0 + Bl IrB + SF + 83 (CDS - QC) + (i,ç) 
+ S y + h ^3 + 87 "2 + »! B C^P + 3 
= bu - ûr„/(bj + 2^ + "4 + "5 - «1 - «g) 
1^ 
= - û^ /(b|^  + 
2^ 
+ 
"4 + "5 - «1 - "2) 
2^ 
= b/(b^  + ''2 + + 
"5 - #2 -
P3 = bj/tt^  + "2 + + "5 - 0^ - û^) 
= b^ /(bj + "2 + + 
'5 - - «2) 
^5 = bj/(ï,j + ''2 + + "5 - 0^  - 0^ 2) 
= bg/0,j + •>2 + + S - 0^  - «2) 
CD
.
 
= b,/&i 
•"•2 
+ + 
'5 
- Qf^  - «2) 
«8 + "2 + + "5 - - 0^2) 
», = + "2 + + S - 0^  - «2) 
The presence of autocorrelation in the error terms in many previous 
econometric studies suggests that corrective techniques may have to be 
applied in this study. Should it prove necessary the Cochrane-Orcutt 
iterative technique (C.O.I.T.) may be used [6], 
In the presence of first-order serially correlated errors this pro­
cedure uses an (internal) ordinary least squares regression to form an 
initial guess of rho, the first order serial coefficient. The following 
iteration then occurs: 
1. All data are transformed by rho (e.g., X^ -pX^ j^ ); 
64 a 
2. Regression is run on the transformed data; 
3. The regression coefficients are multiplied into the original 
independent variables to recalculate the serially correlated 
errors; 
4. A new estimate of rho is formed. 
When rho changes by less than .005 from one iteration to the next or 
when some predetermined number of iterations has occurred (20 in the pro­
gram used) iteration terminates and regression output is produced. A 
similar procedure was used for second order errors. 
Even when the Cochrane-Orcutt technique, or any other similar auto­
correlation correction technique, is used to correct autocorrelation 
problems, T-statistics and standard errors of the regression coefficient 
are biased when lagged dependent variables are present in simultaneous 
equations [19]. To correct this bias the "lAGDEP" feature of the computer 
programming system (Economic Software Package (ESP), editor Robert Rebello, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) used in the preparation of the 
linear regression analysis of this dissertation will be used. The "lAGDEP" 
feature revises the variance-covariance matrix and eliminates the influ­
ences of the lagged dependent variable. While not necessary, the "LAGDEP" 
feature will be used on all regression analysis in which autocorrelation 
is present in an equation with a lagged dependent variable. 
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Time Period and Data 
While aggregate data on CD volume is available from early 1961, 
individual district data, on a regular basis, is only available from 
1964. Thus, with the exception of several runs on aggregate data, the 
majority of the regression runs covered the time period from January 1964 
to June 1973o June 1973 was chosen as a cut-off point because all Regu­
lation Q ceilings were removed in May 1973 and there were not enough 
observations to expand analysis in the Regulation Q free period. 
The data for each interest rate variable consists of 114 four-week 
(or five when a particular month contained five weeks) CD volume and total 
loan volume are monthly data based upon weekly averages, while personal 
income figures are monthly estimates. Interest rates are presented as 
percentages while CD figures and personal income figures are denominated 
in billions of dollars. 
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CHAPTER V. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Overview 
Results of linear regression analysis of the econometric models 
developed from the theoretical model presented in Chapter III are pre­
sented in this chapter. Regression techniques applied include ordinary 
least squares (O.L.S.), generalized least squares, and two-stage least 
squares. Equations are analyzed in both a dynamic--stock adjustment--
and a static context. Data used in this analysis is from the period 
between January 1961 and June 1973. CD supply equations presented are 
estimated from aggregate data for the period from January 1961 to June 
1973 and supply equations for four other geographic areas were estimated 
for the period from January 1964 to June 1973. (The areas considered 
were aggregate U.S. data, New York Federal Reserve District, Chicago 
Federal Reserve District, San Francisco Federal Reserve District, and 
all remaining Federal Reserve Districts.) In addition shorter time 
periods were used to estimate supply equations for aggregate U.S. data. 
(Included were the periods 1961-1965, 1962-1966, 1964-1968, 1965-1969, 
1966-1970, 1967-1971, 1968-1972, and 1969-1973.) 
Stock adjustment equations 
2 Ordinary least squares estimates yielded unadjusted R of at least 
.97 for the stock adjustment form of the CD supply function. These O.L.S. 
supply equations for the five geographic areas considered in this study 
for the period from 1964-1973 are presented in Table 5.1. Figures pre­
sented in parentheses on this table and all other tables are t values of 
the corresponding coefficient and those marked with an a are significant 
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at the five percent level of confidence. The Durbin Watson statistic 
for those O.L.S. equations which have had the Cochrane-Orcott iterative 
technique applied from 1.69 to 2.07 [6], 
In all but one case, that of "all remaining Districts," the first 
order technique produced Durbin Watson statistics in the acceptance 
range (1,72-2.49) of the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis in this 
instance states that autocorrelation is not present. The category "all 
remaining Districts" with its Durbin Watson of 1,69 fell just outside 
the acceptance region and is considered to be in a region of indetermi­
nacy. In this region one can neither accept nor reject the hypothesis 
that autocorrelation is present. While satisfactory Durbin Watson 
statistics have been obtained by applying the Cochrane-Orcutt technique, 
the presence of a lagged endogenous variable, CD^  may also have been 
a factor. As pointed out by Nerlove and Wallis [22], the Durbin Watson 
statistic is asymptotically biased towards two when used with ordinary 
least square estimations which include lagged endogenous variables. 
Aggregate U.S. equations 
Ordinary least square equations estimated for CD supply during the 
two time periods, 1961-1973 and 1964-1973, from aggregate data are quite 
2 
similar in composition with each registering an unadjusted R of over 
.99. In the estimate covering the longer period, five of the nine 
variables considered are both significant and carry the hypothesized 
sign, while in the shorter period four variables are both significant and 
carry the hypothesized sign. Variables from both time periods which are 
significant and carry the anticipated sign are; required reserves on 
Table 5.1. Ordinary least squares estimates of the stock adjustment 
equation and corrections for autocorrelation and the presence 
of a lagged dependent variable CD^  
Equation No. 
and 
Correction Time Constant 
i i 
TB - CD 
i i 
FF - CD 
i i 
CDS - QC 
ALL U.S . BANKS 
(1) None 1961-1973:6 3.18 -1.46 .0709 .9481 
(4.916)* (-4.969)* (.454) (7.186)* 
(1) C.O.I.T. 2.89 -1.44 .025 .855 
(3.247)* (-4.370)* (.1435) (4.804)* 
(1) C.O.I.T. and 
correction 
for lagged 
dependent (3.185)* (4.362)* (.1433) (4.7955)* 
(2) None 1964-1973:6 2.91 -1.516 .0177 .9685 
(3.774)* (-3.656)* (.0857) (4.000)* 
(2) C.O.I.T. 2.523 -1.534 .0439 .9221 
(2.338) (-3.219)* (.0181) (2.888)* 
(2) C.O.I.T. and 
correction 
for lagged 
dependent (2.295) (-3.211) (.0180) (2.881) 
NEW YORK FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(3) None 1964-1973:6 2.606 -1.276 .033 .779 
(4.4506)* (-3.814)* (.2159) (3.738)* 
(3) C.O.I.T. 1.888 -1.038 .048 .558 
(4.3061)* (-4.128)* (.4162) (3.488)* 
(3) C.O.I.T. and 
correction 
for lagged _ « . 
dependent (4.224)* (4.1268) (.4159) (3.485) 
*Indicates t value significant at 5 percent level. 
XI XI 
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E$ - CD FD - CD L r_ r„ CD^  , 
J 4 t-1 
-.384 .112 .0164 10.64 -69.72 .9729 
a / , r , o\a- / o  o i - 7\a , ,  _ f\a (-3.506)" (3.4178)" (3.317)* (4.95)" (-4.381)" (54.76) 
-.284 .6090 .025 5.39 -78.33 .947 
(-2.274)* (3.4122)* (3.7748)* (1.79) (-4.517)* (39.83) 
(-2.245)* (3.336)* 
(-.3567) .438 
(-2.558) (1.84) 
-.281 .679 
(-1.834) (2.088)* 
(3.4816)* (1.744) 
.0183 10.04 
(3.013)* (3.869) 
.028 4.744 
(3.497)* (1.301) 
(-4.514)* (35.72)* 
-70.312 .967 
(-3.574)* (45.800)* 
-75.619 .941 
(-3.198)* (33.95)* 
(-1.821) (2.059)' (3.226)' (1.270) (-3.198)* (30.431)' 
- .220 .7037 
(-2.0506)* (3.297)* 
-.150 
(-1.8606) 
.459 
(2.789)' 
.073 
(3.421)' 
.054 
(3.227)' 
7.456 
(4.531)' 
5.994 
-23.99 
(-1.623) 
25.356 
.892 
(33.851)' 
.930 
(4.7027) (-2.280)" (45.409) a 
(-1.855) (2.779)* (3.279)* (4.701)* (-2.276)* (44.133)* 
Table 5.1. Continued 
Equation No, 
and i i i i i i 
Correction Time Constant TB - CD FF - CD CDS - QC 
CHICAGO FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(4) None 1964-1973:6 .460 -.321 .015 .242 
(2.1618)* (-2.645)^  (2.705)* (3.307)* 
(4) C.O.I.T. .2909 -.235 .023 .159 
(1.688) (-2.402)* (.4917) (2.6575)* 
(4) C.O.I.T. 
and correction 
for lagged dep. 
variable (-1.688) (2.398) (.4908) (2.646)* 
SAN FRANCISCO 
(5) None 1964-1973:6 .130 -.271 -.016 .1895 
(.5160) (-2.722)* (-.320) (3.271)* 
(5) C.O.I.T, .165 -.2060 .0147 .137 
(.6974) (-2.272)* (-.319) (2.530) 
(5) C.O.I.T. and 
correction for 
lagged dep. var. (-.647) (-2.271)* (-.3182) (2.530)* 
REMAINING DISTRICTS COMBINED 
(6) None 1964-1973:6 -.060 -.0189 -.005 .008 
(-.8106) (-.4952) (-2.748)* (.384) 
(6) C.O.I.T. .087 .0207 -.0029 .022 
(-.019) (-.7015) (-.1963) (1.283) 
(6) C.O.I.T. and 
correction for 
lagged dep. var. (1.32) (.6937) (-1.963) (1.281) 
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i i i i 
E$ - CD FD - CD CD 
t-1 
-.794 
(-1.966) 
.149 
(2.043) 
.0370 1.964 
(2.1665)" (2.986)' 
-3.45 .955 
(.6468) (25.1422' 
.0554 
(-1.712) 
.062 
(1.025) 
.018 
(1.343) 
1.689 . 
(3.1561)' 
-5.053 
(-1.175) 
1.000 
(32.052)' 
(-1.704) (1.0149) (1.2833) (3.135)* (-1.174) (30.003)* 
-.5898 
(-1.756) 
-.0149 
(-1.625) 
.062 
(1.165) 
.011 
(.219) 
.0271 
(2.054)' 
.017 
(1.436) 
1.065 
(1.518) 
.948 
(1.452) 
-6.9883 
(-1.543) 
-9.281 
.955 
(21.2002) 
.991. 
(-2.22)" (23.26) 
(-1.623) (.2169) (1.270) (1.372) (-2.224)* (20.163)* 
-.020 
(-1.56) 
-.173 
(-1.717) 
.019 
(.5878) 
.014 
(.8525) 
.0397 
(5.466)' 
.021 , 
(3.094)' 
-.489 , 
(-2.103)' 
,0218 
(.099) 
-4.515 .7603 
(-2.617)* (16.489)* 
-3.769 
(-2.725)' 
.9108 
(21.465)^  
(-1.707) (.8399) (2.752) (.0950) (-2.724)* (18.3049)* 
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Table 5.1. Continued 
Equation No. 
and 2^  d 
Correction R R S.E. D.W. 
ALL U.S. BANKS 
(1) None .9987 ,9985 .583 1.407 
(1) C.O.I.T. 2.079 
(1) C.O.I.T. and 
correction for 
lagged dep. var. 
(2) None .9965 .9960 ,667 1.4261 
(2) C.O.I.T. 2.0689 
(2) C.O.I.T. and 
correction for 
lagged dep. var. 
NEW YORK FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(3) None .9877 .9865 .510 1.365 
(3) C.O.I.T, 1.7467 
(3) C.O.I.T. and 
correction for 
lagged dep. var. 
R^^  = coefficient of determination. 
2 2 E = R adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
'^ D.W. = Durbin Watson statistic. 
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Table 5.1. Continued 
Equation No. 
and 2 A 
Correction R TT S.E. D.W. 
CHICAGO FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(4) None .9841 .9838 .1919 
(4) CoO.I.T. 2.001 
(4) Co0,1.To and 
correction for 
lagged dep. var. 
SAN FRANCISCO 
(5) None .992 .991 .164 lo5577 
(5) C.O.I.T. lo9948 
(5) C.O.I.T. and 
correction for 
lagged dep. var. 
REMAINING DISTRICTS COMBINED 
(6) None .9948 .9939 .062 1.0546 
(6) CoO.I.T. 1.9765 
(6) CoO.IoT. and 
correction for 
lagged dep. var. 
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Eurodollars, required reserves on CD's, total loans, and lagged CD's. 
The interest rate differential between the Federal Reserve discount rate 
and the CD rate carried the correct sign and was significant for the 
1961-1973 period while in the shorter period it again carried the correct 
sign but was not significant at the five percent confidence level. 
Other geographic areas 
Ordinary least square estimates for New York, Chicago, San Francisco 
and all remaining Federal Reserve Districts' CD supply equations were 
similar to those obtained from aggregate data. Variables with the 
correct sign and significant in the New York equation were: the differ­
ential between the Federal Reserve discount rate and the CD rate, total 
loans, required reserves on Eurodollars, required reserves on CD's and 
lagged CD's. Significant and correct-in-sign variables for Chicago were: 
the differential between the Federal Reserve discount rate and the CD 
rate, total loans, required reserves on Eurodollars, and lagged CD's. 
San Francisco showed the following variables with correct signs and 
significant: Total loans and lagged CD's. The "remaining District" 
equation had required reserves on Eurodollars, total loans, and lagged 
CD's correctly signed and significant. Corrective procedures for the 
presence of autocorrelation (as indicated by low values for the Durbin 
Watson statistic) and a lagged dependent variable did not produce 
significantly different estimates for the respective supply equations. 
In general, the correction procedure for the presence of a lagged depen­
dent variable uniformly lowered each coefficient's respective t value. 
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Recognizing that the lack of significance on many of the interest 
rate differential variables may partially be attributable to an identi­
fication problem, a two-stage least squares equation approach was used 
to eliminate the effects of the simultaneous determination of CD volume 
and CD rates. The two-stage least square equation results which were 
very similar to the O.L.S. estimates, are shown in Table 5.2. The two-
stage least square approach did not add to the list of significant and 
correctly signed variables, however the autocorrelation correction tech­
nique did continue to produce Durbin Watson statistics in the acceptable 
range and the explanatory value of the equations, in terms of explained 
2 
variation (R ), remained high (each equation in excess of .98). 
The presence of a relatively high degree of correlation between the 
rate differential variables led to the creation of an index variable 
(Z)o Variable Z, obtained by converting the rate differentials to an 
index was used in place of the individual rate differentials in some of 
the two stage estimates. In each case it carried a negative coefficient, 
contrary to anticipation, and was significant in only one equation, that 
of "all remaining Districts." 
The possibility of structural changes during the 12 year period 
between 1961 and 1973 led to two stage least square adjustment estimates 
involving shorter time periods. These estimates presented in Table 5.3 
are based upon five year periods and are for U.S. aggregate data only. 
While several events happened in this 12 year period which would make 
convenient starting and stopping dates (for example the credit crunch in 
1966 and 1969) it was believed that additional comparisons should be made 
Table 5.2. Two stage least square estimates of stock adjustment equation 
with correction applied for autocorrelation and the presence 
of a lagged dependent variable CD^  
Equation No. 
and 
Correction Time Constant 
A 
i i 
TB - CD 
i i 
FF - CD 
i 
CDS - QC 
ALL U.S. BANKS 
(1) None 1961-•1973:6 2.626 
(3.353)* 
-4.175 
(-3.579)* 
.3562 
(1.7018) 
1.981 
(4.386)* 
(1) C.O.I.T. .4967 
(.4072) 
-3.9807* 
(-2.319) 
.265 
(1.151) 
1.711 
(2.438)* 
(1) CoOoI.T. 
Lag. Dep. 
and 
Cor. (.3625) (-2.312)* (1.144) (2.433)* 
(2) None 1964-•1973:6 2.323 
(2.462)* 
-4.244 
(-2.858)* 
.336 
(1.299) 
1.978 
(3.1876) 
(2) C.O.I.T. -1.076 
(-.627) 
-4.698 
(-2.017) 
.2680 
(.892) 
2.148 
(2.185) 
(2) C.O.I.T. 
Lag. Dep. 
and 
Cor. (-.499) (-2.077)* (.873) (2.151) 
(3) C.O.I.T. 1964-1973:6 2.772 
(2.8828)* 
.4282 
(2.5408)* 
(3) C.O.I.T. 
Lag. Dep. 
and 
Cor. (2.868)* (2.452)* 
NEW YORK ; FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(4) None 1964-1973:6 -1.43 a 
(3,549)* 
.104 
(1.312) 
.785 
(.545) 
.785 
(1.688) 
(4) C.O.I.T. 1.38 
(2.4817)* 
-1.67 
(-1.809) 
.140 
(.9096) 
.727 
(1.824) 
(4) Lag. Dep. (2.46)* (-1.809) (.908) (1.824) 
(5) C.O.I.T. 1964-1973:6 1.49 
(2.738)* 
-.721 
(-.815) 
(5) Lag. Dep. (2.722)* (-.765) 
I^ndicates t value significant at 5 percent level. 
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A A 
i i i i 
E$ - CD BF - CD Z L 
-.2782 
(-2.159)' 
- .260 
(-2.159)' 
.7305, 
(3.649)' 
1.115 
(3.406)' 
.015 
(2.679)* 
.0316 
(3.607)* 
17.739 
(5.023)* 
6.641 
(1.202) 
-38.884 
(-1.939) 
-22.027 
(-.8820) 
(-2.155)' (3.242)' .a (2.801)- (1.159) (-.878) 
-.271 
:-1.604) 
.6846 
(1.991) 
.016 
(2.288)* 
17.290 
(3.998)* 
-41.33 
(-1.571) 
.008 
(.039) 
1.586 
(2.890) 
.044 
(3.798)* 
4.663 
(.639) 
6.25 
(.172) 
(.0338) (2.6928)* (2.5162)* (.615) (.1688) 
-.2017 
(-2.58)* 
.0059 
(1.064) 
.785 
(2.684)* 
-10.127 a 
(-5.310)* 
(-2.57)* (.990) (2.625)* (-5.268)* 
-2.19 
(1.754) 
.608 
(2,199) 
.060 
(2.561)* 
8.034 
(2.580) 
-21.37 
(-1.01) 
-.087 
(-.843) 
.4393 
(1.844) 
.044 
(2.233)* 
7.24 
(2.715)* 
-15.33 
(-.939) 
(-.838) (1.840) (2.18)* (2.712)* (-.937) 
' 
-.058 
(-1.785) 
.020 
(1.68) 
.388 
(2.71)* 
-4.02 
(-3.33)* 
(-1.78) (1.59) (2.69)* (-3.27)* 
Table 5.2. Continued 
Equation No, a a 
and i i i i i 
Correction Time Constant TB - CD FF - CD CDS - QC 
CHICAGO FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(6) None 1964-1973:6 .362 
(1.557) 
-.735 
(-1.89) 
.067 
(.976) 
.392 
(2.397)* 
(6) C.O.I.T. .139 
(.699) 
-.692 
(-2.07)* 
.066 
(1.17) 
.320 
(2.25)* 
(6) Lag. Dep. (.699) (-2.06)* (1.16) (2.24)* 
(7) C.O.I.T. .127 
(.621) 
.011 
(.387) 
(7) Lag. Dep. (.620) (.360) 
SAN FRANCISCO FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(8) None 1964-1973:6 -.087 
(-.278) 
-.680 
(-1.856) 
.0254 
(.413) 
.337 
(2.228)* 
(8) C.O.I.T. -.242 
(-.478) 
-.032 
(-.493) 
-.027 
(-.457) 
-.273 
(-.079) 
(8) Lag. Dep. (-.470) (-.487) (-.450) (-.074) 
(9) C.O.I.T. 1964-1973:6 -.335 
(1.107) 
.002 
(.076) 
(9) Lag. Dep. (-.8088 (.0634) 
REMAINING DISTRICTS COMBINED 
(10) None 1964-1973:6 -.095 
(-.879) 
-.270 
(-.548) 
-.024 
(-2.478)* 
.050 
(.673) 
(10) C.O.I.T. -.075 
(-.796) 
-.148 
(-.476) 
-.037 
(-2.338)* 
.033 
(.547) 
(10) C.O.I.T. 
Lag. Dep 
and 
. Cor. (-.687) (-.475) (-2.078)* (.487) 
70d 
i i i i 
E$ - CD BF - CD Z L 
-.065 
(-1.445) 
.183 
(1.945) 
.032 
(1.766) 
3.072 
(2.738) 
.888 
(.129) 
-.024 
(-.629) 
.108 
(1.303) 
.017 
(1.000) 
2.69 
(2.77) 
.083 
(.014) 
(-.625) (1.290) (1.000) (2.76)* (.014) 
-.021 
(-1.71) 
.014 
(1.29) 
.054 
(.925) 
-.8881 
(-2.08)* 
(-1.70) (1.16) (.897) (-2.06)* 
-.055 
(-1.374) 
.109 
(1.341) 
.036 
(2.270)* 
1.73 
(1.680) 
-3.424 
(-.544) 
-.033 
(-.868) 
-.059 
(-1.319) 
.028 
(1.748) 
.042 
(-.489) 
-1.149 
(-2.453) 
(-.839) (-1.151) (.931) (-.340) (-2.403) 
-.037 a 
(-2.591) 
.035 
(2.757)* 
.071 
(-.960) 
-1.047 
(-2.403) 
(-2.567)* (2.698)* (-.791) (-2.402) 
-.170 
(-1.823) 
.070 
(.786) 
.044 
(4.785)* 
.402 
(2.004) 
-3.684 
(-2.758)* 
-.240 
(-1.762) 
.103 
(.699) 
.039 
(4.289)* 
.327 
(1.972) 
-3.145 
(-2.445)= 
(-1.655) (.582) (3.298)* (1.902) (2.143)* 
70e 
Table 5.2, Continued 
Equation No, 
and 2^ -2'^  d 
Correction CD R R S.E. D.W. 
t-1 
ALL U.S. BANKS 
(1) None .9857 .998 .996 .662 1.216 
(49.126)* 
(1) C.O.I.T. .9318^  .997 .995 2.038 
(29.294)' 
(1) C.O.I.T, and 
lag. Dep. Cor. (21.186) 
(2) None .982 .996 .994 .760 1.229 
(41.1827) 
(2) C.O.I.T. .896 .997 .995 .674 2.059 
(22.223)* 
a (2) Lag. Dep. Cor. (12.715) 
1.034 
(33.571) 
(3) C.O.I.T.  ^ .996 .994 .729 1.445 
(3) Lag. Dep. Cor. (-30.901)* 
NEW YORK FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(4) None .911 .985 .981 .559 1.230 
(31.681)* 
(4) C.O.I.T. .949 .992 .989 .408 1.55 
(38.656)* 
(4) Lag. Dep. (36.691)* 
(5) C.O.I.T. .940 .992 .990 .409 1.579 
(28.67)* 
(5) Lag. Dep. (25.92)* 
R^^  = coefficient of determination. 
= adjusted for degrees of freedom. 
D^.W. = Durbin Watson statistic. 
70f 
Table 5.2. Continued 
Equation No. 
and 
Correction CD t-1 S.E. D.W. 
(6) None 
(6) C.O.I.T. 
(6) Lag. Dep. 
(7) C.O.I.T. 
(7) Lag. Dep. 
(8) None 
(8) C.O.I.T. 
(8) Lag. Dep. 
(9) C.O.I.T. 
(9) Lag. Dep. 
CHICAGO FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
.976 .981 .977 
(24.822)* 
1.02 .989 .986 
(29.628)* 
(26.831)* 
1.015 .988 .985 
(25.858)* 
(22.09)* 
SAN FRANCISCO FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
.202 
.157 
.158 
.928 .990 .987 
(17.719)* 
.931 .993 .990 
(16.023)* 
(7.828)* 
.913 .993 .991 
(16.924)* 
(9.778)* 
REMAINING DISTRICTS COMBINED 
.182 
.154 
.153 
(10) None 
(10) C.O.I.T. 
(10) C.O.I.T. and 
.882 
(14.782) 
.923 , 
(12.986) 
.989 
.990 
.985 
.987 
.133 
.207 
1.396 
1.907 
1.88 
1,247 
1.919 
1.918 
1.103 
1.987 
Lag. Dep. Cor. (11.451) 
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by moving the regression period across time. This was accomplished by 
taking the starting period as 1961-1965 and then adding a year while 
simultaneously dropping a year from the beginning. 
The equations based upon U.S. aggregate data estimated for five 
year intervals did not differ markedly from the equations obtained from 
over the period 1961-1973, except that fewer variables were significant. 
2 2 
The same high R values, but not greater than the R for the 1961-1973 
period, suggest that no significant structural change has taken place. 
And, Chow tests performed upon equations for the subperiods 1961-1966 
and 1967-1973 positively support this thought. The gradual decline in 
the value of the coefficient of the lagged CD value does suggest one 
important facet of bank behavior which will be discussed below. 
Adjustment Coefficient 
In a stock adjustment model the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable is assumed to be (1 - y), where Y is an adjustment coefficient. 
Thus we can obtain an estimate of Y by subtracting the coefficient of 
CD^  ^  from one (Y = 1 - coefficient of CD^ _^ ). In this particular 
application V represents how fast banks move to adjust their actual stock 
of CD's to their desired level (CD*). The relatively high values of the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (CD^  for each of the 
geographic areas estimated (1964-1973 equations) produces very low 
estimates of Y implying that bankers move slowly to adjust their CD's. 
However, the coefficient present in the equations estimated from shorter 
periods (from U.S. data) suggest that bankers move to adjust their CD 
Table 5.3. Two-stage least squares estimates of stock adjustment 
equation using five year moving period with corrections for 
autocorrelation and the presence of a lagged dependent 
variable CD_ 
Equation No. 
and 
Correction Time Constant 
i i i i i 
TB - CD FF - CD CDS - QC 
ALL U.S. BAMS 
(1) C.O.I.T. 1961-1965 1.010 
(1.532) 
-.263 
(-.604) 
.250 
(1.532) 
-.007 
(-.212) 
(1) Correction for 
presence of 
lag, dep. var. 
(2) C.O.I.T. 1962-1966 
(.812) (-.597) 
.216 
(.233) 
-1.556 
(1.527) 
.446 
(-3.112) (1.989) 
(-.209) 
-.009 
(-.238) 
(2) Correction for 
presence of 
lag. dep. var. (.219) (-3.089) (1.981)* (-.235) 
(3) C.O.I.T. 1963-1967 -3.657 .851 .361 .184 
(-2.079) (-1.347) (1.008) (2.615) 
(3) Correction for 
presence of 
lag. dep. var. (-1.841) (-1.346) (.995) (2.300) 
(4) C.O.I.T. 1964-1968 -2.104 -.581 -.110 .714 
(-1.759) (-.624) (-.415) (1.613) 
(4) Correction for 
presence of 
lag. dep. var. 
(5) C.O.I.T. 1965-1969 
(-1.240) (-.542) (-.308) (1.470) 
.264 
(.197) 
-1.141 
(-1.379) 
.132 
(.539) 
.352 
(.893) 
Correction for 
presence of 
lag. dep. var. (.184) (-1.358) (.539) (.854) 
I^ndicates t value significant at 5 percent level. 
72b 
A A 
i i i i 
E$ - CD BF - CD L Z CD^   ^
-.259 
(-1.499) 
.0138 
(.051) 
-.0036 
(-.3397) 
.999 
(15.917): 
(-1.481) 
-.431 
(-2.295)* 
(.050) 
.680 
(3.369) 
(-.322) 
.0213 
(1.844) 
(14.865) 
.902 
(15.53)' 
a 
(-2.244) 
-.733 . 
(3.341) 
.555 . 
(1.723) 
.066 
(-3.043)* (2.504)" (4.456)' 
1.138 
(.276) 
(14.196) 
.556 
(6.409)' 
(-2.959)' 
-.677 
(2.447)* (3.05)* 
1.036 
(-2.926)" (3.747)* (5.009)* (-1.236) 
.086 
(.275) 
-4.127 
(3.961) 
.508 
(4.959)' 
(-2.876)* (3.159)* 
-.709 
(-3.774)' 
.559 
(1.795) 
(2.453)* (-1.170) 
.027 
(2.397) a 
-0.246 
(-.061) 
(2.137) 
.819 
(12.063) a 
(-3.763)* (1.761) (2.319)* (-.059) (9.064) 
Table 5.3, Continued 
Equation No.  ^ a 
and i i i i i 
Correction Time Constant TB - CD FF - CD CDS - QC 
(6) C.O.I.T. 1966-1970 1.143 -.766 .075 .224 
(.410) (-.681) (-.241) (.607) 
(6) Correction for 
presence of 
lag. dep. var. (.410) (-.678) (-.239) (.580) 
(7) C.O.I.T. 1967-1971 -3.656 -1.111 -.115 -.413 
(-.886) (-1.051) (-.345) (-.170) 
(7) Correction for 
presence of 
lag. dep. var. (-.883) (-1.053) (-.338) (-.149) 
(8) C.O.I.T. 1968-1972 -1.086 -1.114 .326 .376 
(.765) (-.789) (1.064) (1.641) 
(8) Correction for 
presence of 
lag. dep. var. (.763) (-.782) (1.032) (1.592) 
(9) C.O.I.T. 1969-6/73 -26.968 -1.157 .182 .136 
(-3.409) (-.840) (.382) (.436) 
(9) Correction for 
presence of 
lag. dep. var. (-2.212) (-.840) (.378) (.409) 
72d 
1 
E$ 
1 
CD 
-.568 
(-2.676)' 
1 
BF 
1 
CD 
1.19 
(2.762) 
.044 
(4.142)' 
-2.861 
(-.552) 
CD jLd. 
.818 
(13.39)" 
(-2.659)' 
-.283 
(-1.558) 
(2.750)' 
.571 
(1.452) 
(4.069) 
.035 
(3.936)' 
(-.534) 
3.538 
(.532) 
(9.962) 
.789 
(12.194) 
a 
a 
(-1.555) 
-.368 
(-1.474) 
(1.397) 
.758 
(1.720) 
(3.413)' 
.061 
(2.979) 
(.517) 
-2.211 
(-.356) 
(8.386)' 
.788 , 
(7.685) 
(-1.442) 
.0018 
(.0087) 
(1.699) 
.366 
(.758)' 
(2.971)* (-.351) 
.128 
(4.16) 
-2.98 
(-.865) 
(7.426) 
.647 
(6.73)* 
(.0087) (.743)* (2.47) (-.841) (3.72) 
Table 5.3, Continued 
72e 
Equation No, 
and 2 
Correction R R S,E. D,W. 
(1) C.O.IoT. .998 .998 .233 1.928 
(1) Correction for 
presence of 
lag. dep. var, 
(2) C.O.I.T. .997 .992 .267 2.030 
(2) Correction for 
presence of 
lag. dep. var. 
(3) C.O.I.T. .994 .990 .340 1.950 
(3) Correction for 
presence of 
lag. dep. var. 
(4) C.O.I.T. .991 .986 .347 1.958 
(4) Correction for 
presence of 
lag, dep. var. 
(5) C.O.I.T. .979 .978 .472 1.812 
(5) Correction for 
presence of 
lag. dep. var. 
(6) C.O.I.T. .977 .971 .597 1.954 
(6) Correction for 
presence of 
lag. dep. var. 
(7) C.O.I.T. .991 .985 .617 2.012 
(7) Correction for 
presence of 
lag. dep. var. 
72f 
Table 5.3, Continued 
Equation No. 
and 2 o 
Correction R R S.E. D.W. 
(8) C.O.I.I. .990 .985 .610 1.970 
(8) Correction for 
presence of 
lag. dep. var. 
(9) C.O.I.T. .997 .993 .777 1.874 
(9) Correction for 
presence of 
lag. dep. var. 
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holdings more rapidly. The coefficient from the 1964-1973 equations may 
also reflect the overall strong growth trend present in CD volume. 
Static Equations 
Correlation matrices revealed the existence of high correlation 
between the lagged dependent variable, CD^  and many of the independent 
variables. The existence of such correlation between endogenous variables 
can be considered harmful in that estimates of the regression coefficients 
are imprecise [19]. To remedy this problem the equations were run with­
out the presence of the lagged dependent variable CD^  As such, without 
the presence of the lagged CD variable, these equations are of a static 
nature and accordingly may be misspecified. However, the presence of 
larger adjustment coefficients (smaller CD^  ^  coefficients) obtained 
during periods when Regulation Q was for the most part above money market 
rates on such instruments as Treasury bills and commercial paper and 
a priori information obtained from informal interviews with bankers, 
suggests that bankers move rapidly to bring their CD issues to desired 
levels. 
Static equations estimated by O.L.S. techniques (Table 5.4) and two-
stage least squares (Table 5.5) were in general disappointing as fewer 
variables were significant than in the stock adjustment equations. In 
addition, the Cochrane-Orcutt technique was not completely successful 
in removing the presence of autocorrelation [4]. However, while the 
2 
signs of the variables were disappointing, the unadjusted R 's continued 
high, ranging from .854 to .959 for the O.L.S. equations and from .844 to 
Table 5.4. Ordinary least squares estimates of the static equation with 
corrections for autocorrelation 
Equation No. 
and 
Correction Time Constant 
i 
TB - CD 
i i 
FF - CD 
i 
CDS - QC 
ALL U.S . BANKS 
(1) None 1961-1973:6 -5.021 
(-1.691) 
-2.688 
(-1.9415) 
-.9368 
(-1.281) 
1.4658 
(2.361)* 
(1) C.O.I.T. 1961-1973:6 -35.337 
(-5.760)* 
- .884 
(-1.682) 
-.292 
(-1.208) 
.3804 
(.994) 
(2) None 1964-1973:6 -5.40 
(1.549) 
-4.511 
(-2.405) 
-1.835 
(-1.979) 
2.907 
(2.663)* 
(2) C.O.I.T. 4.824 
(.814) 
-1.636 
(-2.303) 
-.3806 
(1.067) 
1.075 
(1.926) 
NEW YORK FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(3) None 1964-1973:6 7.878 
(4.044)* 
-2.543 
(2.2204) 
-.6979 
(-1.324) 
1.910 ^  
(2.692)* 
(3) C.O.I.T. 18.879 
(1.417) 
-.574 
(-1.386) 
-.248 
(-1.204) 
.362 
(1.104) 
CHICAGO FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 
(4) None 1964-1973:6 .586 
(1.043) 
-.764 
(-2.399) 
-.218 
(-1.043) 
.654 
(3.445) 
(4) C.O.I.T. -4.332 
(-2.374) 
-.0691 
(-.449) 
-.0585 
(-.756) 
-.007 
(-.058) 
SAN FRANCISCO FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 
(5) None 
(5) C.O.I.T. 
1964-1973:6 -3.579 
(-8.508) 
-.3416 
(-.1549) 
-.3096 -.2121 
(-1.351) (-1.855) 
-.0075 -.0122 
(-.0477) (-.1549) 
.163 
(1.228) 
-.063 
(-.5095) 
I^ndicates t value significant at 5 percent level. 
74b 
i i i i 
E$ - CD BF - CD L 
-2.211 
(-4.489)* 
3.455 
(6.678)* 
.254 
(22.716)* 
-53.869 
(-6.352)* 
-268.06 
(-4.067)* 
-.3344 
(-2.050)* 
1.344 
(3.091)* 
.385 ^ 
(7.796)* 
-10.178 
(-1.426) 
37.073 
(1.164) 
-1.453 
(-2.309) 
4.715 
(4.701) 
.2635 
(19.594) 
-48.078 
(4.639)* 
-203.25 
(2.399)* 
-.279 
(1.405) 
1.972 
(3.254) 
.088 
(3.623)* 
-12.641 
(1.607) 
9.30 
(.225) 
-1.298 
(-3.657) 
3.1106 
(4.480)* .591 a (11,475) 
-.169 
(-.030) 
-169.12 
(-3.465)* 
-.067 
(-.580) 
.632 
(1.772) 
.234 
(3.52)* 
4.2045 
(.9037) 
-6.93 
(-.294) 
.340 
(-3.281) 
.143 
(1,073) 
.391 
(15.138) 
-3.410 
(-2.070) 
-10.134 
(-1.361) 
-.009 
(-.2141) 
.174 
(1.289) 
.329 
(6.036) 
-.997 
(-.586) 
14.793 
(1.696) 
-.108 
(1.404) 
.318 
(2.6303) 
.284 
(23,474) 
-8.146 
(-6.440) 
-8.925 
(-8.59) 
-.403 
(-.9247) 
.093 
(.6878) 
.173 
(4.997) 
-2.2089 
(-1.251) 
8.471 
(.9409) 
Table 5.4. Continued 
Equation No. 
and i i i i i 
Correction Time Constant TB - CD FF - CD CDS - QC 
REMAINING FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS 
(6) None 1964-1973:6 -.411 
(-3.049) 
(6) C.O.I.T. -1.011 
(-2.4416) 
-.1466 .0010 .0647 
(-2.067) (.0303) (1.691) 
-.3686 .0244 .0245 
(-.810) (1.066) (.6850) 
74d 
i 1 
E$ - CD BF - CD L 
- .0535 
(-2.183) 
- .019 
(-1.544) 
.1208 
(3.336) 
.037 
( .9761) 
.1376 
(17.094) 
.1247 
(6.196) 
-1.958 
(-4.81) 
- .8165 
(-1.604) 
-3.384 
(-1.037) 
1.577 
(.6026) 
74e 
Table 5.4. Continued 
Equation No. 
and 
Correction R r2 S.E. D.ff. 
(1) None 
(1) C.O.I.T. 
(2) None 
(2) C.O.I.T. 
ALL U.S. BANKS 
.954 .952 
.996 .992 
.931 .925 
.994 
2.751 
.7566 
3.055 
.8798 
.2693 
.8944 
.2673 
.8684 
(3) None 
(3) C.O.I.T. 
NEW YORK FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
.854 
.989 
.851 
.983 
1.762 
.486 
.3298 
1.1334 
(4) None 
(4) C.O.I.T. 
CHICAGO FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 
.884 
.986 
.881 
.982 
.5081 
.1787 
.3426 
1.4066 
(5) None 
(5) C.O.I.T. 
SAN FRANCISCO FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 
.9587 
.989 
.953 
.984 
.3768 
.1853 
.3776 
1.344 
(6) None 
(6) C.O.I.T. 
REMAINING FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS 
.989 .983 .1175 
.981 .978 .053 
.2973 
1.3936 
Table 5.5. Two-stage least squares estimate of static equation with 
correction for autocorrelation 
Equation No. 
and 
Correction Time Constant 
i i 
TB - CD 
i i 
FF - CD 
i 
CDS - QC 
ALL U.S. BANKS 
(1) None 1961-1973:6 -5.693 
(-1.750) 
-5.456 
(-1.099) 
-.661 
(-.745) 
2.521 
(1.311) 
(1) C.O.I.T. -74.848 
(-4.417)* 
-.546 
(-.1945) 
-.244 
(-.726) 
.229 
(.1877) 
(2) None 1964-1973:6 -7.140 
(-1.885) 
-11.577 
(-1.897) 
-1.124 
(-1.057) 
5.576 
(2.192) 
(2) C.O.I.T. -195.99 
(-4.165)* 
.1265 
(-.034) 
-.489 
(-1.156) 
.052 
(.035) 
NEW YORK FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT • BANKS 
(3) None 1964-1973:6 8.432 
(4.011)* 
1.192 
(.337) 
-.931 
(-1.520) 
.3316 
(.221) 
(3) C.O.I.T. 110.33 
(3.876)* 
-3.503 
(-1.936) 
-.0312 
(-.133) 
1.5941 
(1.942) 
CHICAGO FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT BANKS 
(4) None 1964-1973:6 .4508 
(.739) 
-1.287 
(-1.270) 
-.152 
(-.854) 
.841 
(1.979) 
(4) C.O.I.T. -3.714 
(-1.873) 
-.9420 
(-1.403) 
-.005 
(1.973) 
.371 
(1.224) 
SAN FRANCISCO FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT BANKS 
(5) None 
(5) C.O.I.T. 
1964-1973:6 -4.082 -2.519 -.0205 
(-9.445)* (-3.590)* (-.167) 
.194 -1.18 .058 
(.079) (-1.703) (.658) 
1.022 
(3.506) 
.441 
(1.412) 
a 
I^ndicates t value significant at 5 percent level. 
75b 
1 1 
E$ - CD 
i i 
BF - CD 
-2.128 
(-4.058)* 
3.811 
(4.710)* 
.256 
(21.495) 
-47.53 
(-3.41)* 
-239.45 
(-2.866)* 
-.321 
(-1.433) 
1.218 
(2.314) 
.322 
(10.321)* 
-11.879 
(-1.338) 
322094 
(.847) 
-1.203 
(-1.822) 
5.550 
(4.15)* 
.268 
(18.355) 
-31.97 
(-1.858) 
-133.55 
(-1.231) 
-.341 
(-1.256) 
1.476 
(2.071)* 
.399 a 
(9.045) 
-11.744 
(-1.171) 
43.330 
(.908) 
-1.490 
(3.880)* 
2.373 
(2,696)* 
.5667 
(10.262)* 
-9.318 
(-.9358) 
-24.985 
(-3.468)* 
.1531 
(.981) 
.9903 
(2.392)* 
.2100 
(3.131)* 
9.7913 
(1.725) 
31.7114 
(1.158) 
-.337 
(-2.95) 
.868 
(3.684) 
.393 
(14.101) 
-2.237 
(-.744) 
-14.881 
(-.828) 
.037 
(.652) 
.277 
(1.797) 
.277 
(5.679) 
.634 
(.299) 
20.652 
(2.038) 
-.025 
(-.326) 
.6210 
(4.107)* 
.2954^  
(24.074) 
-2.954 
(-1.485) 
14.608 
(1.177) 
.023 
(.404) 
.237 
(1.513) 
.166 
(4.848)* 
-.044 
(.020) 
17.114 
(1.640) 
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Table 5.5. Continued 
Equation No, 
and 
Correction R S.E. D.W. 
(1) None 
(1) C.O.I.T. 
(2) None 
2) C.O.I.T. 
(3) None 
(3) C.O.I.T. 
ALL U.S. BANKS 
.952 
.9975 
.925 
.995 
.948 
.992 
.920 
.991 
2.818 
.7523 
3.149 
.832 
NEW YORK FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT BANKS 
.9449 
.989 
.939 
.983 
1.816 
.4835 
CHICAGO FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT BANKS 
(4) None .875 .871 .528 
(4) C.O.I.T. .920 .916 
SAN FRANCISCO FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT BANKS 
(5) None .961 .957 .3641 
(5) C.O.I.T. .990 .987 .188 
.3229 
.8358 
.3081 
.9081 
.4062 
1.075 
.366 
.3891 
1.4491 
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.961 for the two stage least squares equations. Variable Z, the index 
variable of interest rate differentials, replacing the individual interest 
rate differentials in several equations, was always insignificant and 
carried the wrong sign. 
Evaluation of empirical results 
The close fits between actual and estimated values of CD volume 
obtained from the static equations offers support to the assumption that 
bankers adjust their outstanding CD's rapidly. In addition, the close 
fits obtained from both the stock adjustment equations and the static 
equations overall provides positive evidence of the theoretical model's 
explanatory value (see Figure 5.1). 
While the performance of the individual interest rate differential 
variables were disappointing, the often positive, though not significant 
coefficient of the Federal funds CD rate differential was consistent with 
the model's predictions. It is believed that the often significant, but 
incorrectly signed coefficient of the Treasury bill CD rate differential 
may be attributed at least partly to institutional factors. Bankers, as 
discussed in Chapter I, typically offer a yield on their CD's above that 
of similar maturity Treasury bills so as to insure that their CD's are 
competitive. 
The strong positive relationship between total loan volume and CD's 
was as expected and is consistent with results obtained from earlier 
studies. The relatively small size of the loan coefficient, even in 
the static equation results, (for example equation 2, Table 5.4 has a 
loan coefficient of .268) appears to be inconsistent with much of the 
CD Volume 
(billions of dollars) 
actual 
stock adjustment equation 
static equation 50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Figure 5.1. Two-stage least estimate of static equation and stock adjust equation for U.S. versus 
actual U.S. CD volume, January 1961 through June 1973 (monthly observations) 
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historical literature on CD's - inconsistent in that much of the 
literature claims that banks issue CD's primarily for loan use. 
The answer to this apparent inconsistency is that while a great many 
banks issue CD's, a few large banks continue to account for the bulk of 
CD issues.^  Aggregate figures thus distort individual bank relation­
ships. 
The significant and consistent signs of the reserve requirements 
on both CD's and Eurodollars provides rationale for monetary authorities 
to use reserve changes as a means of implementing monetary policy and/or 
shifts in the composition of member bank liabilities. 
For example in the Atlanta Federal Reserve District in January ?-572 
while 552 banks had outstanding CD's, a few banks located in New Orleans, 
Atlanta, and Nashville accounted for 75 percent of the District's out­
standing CD's. "Negotiable CD's reach record level at District Banks, 
Monthly Review. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, July 1972. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND POLICY PROPOSALS 
Summary 
A description of the CD market in the U.S. has been presented. A 
utility maximization model has been combined with a stock adjustment 
model to explain the CD's issued by U.S. banks. Profits, supply 
liquidity, and soundness are entered as arguments in the utility maxi­
mization model. The empirical sample used in the examination of the 
model ran from January 1961 to June 1973 for all U.S. banks and from 
January 1964 to June 1973 for the four remaining areas considered. 
Empirical results were found to be consistent with the existing 
literature. 
Policy Proposals 
The continued significance of the reserve variables--required 
reserves on CD's and on Eurodollars--suggests that the Federal Reserve 
System has additional tools to control the expansion of bank credit. 
The results presented here support the November 1974 action of the 
Federal Reserve System. At that time the reserve requirement on all 
time deposits (including CD's) with maturities of at least 180 days and 
on the first $5 million of shorter-maturity time deposits was set at 6 
percent. The Board's lowering of the reserve requirement on longer term 
deposits was intended to provide an incentive for banks to improve their 
liquidity by lengthening the maturities of their liabilities [3]. 
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The discrepancy between the stock adjustment equations and the 
static equations with regard to the adjustment coefficient suggests a 
continued need for theoretical and empirical work on how banks adjust to 
a changing economic environment. Since monetary policy makers are often 
forced to assume primary responsibility for combating inflation, a better 
understanding of bank behavior would certainly aid the policy makers in 
applying their tools. 
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APPENDIX: SOURCES OF DATA. USED IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
CD volume - - Federal Reserve Board's statistical release 'Veekly 
Summary of Large Commercial Banks" (Form H 12). 
igp ----- Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
i  - - - - -  W e e k l y  r a n g e  f i g u r e s  w e r e  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  t h e  F e d e r a l  
Reserve Bank of New York, Midpoints of each range were 
used as the value. 
C^DS - - - - Secondary Market rates on CD's with 90 day maturity 
obtained from Federal Reserve Board tapes. 
i - - - - Commercial paper rate on four to six month paper--
CrR 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
i  .  - - - - -  F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e  B o a r d  t a p e s .  
EÇ 
%F 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
i  - - - - -  Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
r ^  - - - - -  R e s e r v e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o n  d e m a n d  d e p o s i t s  a t  R e s e r v e  C i t y  
banks in excess of five million dollars--Federal Reserve 
Bulletin. 
- - - - -  R e s e r v e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o n  t i m e  a n d  s a v i n g s  d e p o s i t s  i n  
excess of five million dollars—Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
- - - - -  M a r g i n a l  r e s e r v e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o n  E u r o d o l l a r  b o r r o w i n g s —  
Federal Eteserve Bulletin. 
L  - - - - -  F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e  B o a r d ' s  s t a t i s t i c a l  r e l e a s e  " W e e k l y  S u m m a r y  
of Large Commercial Banks" (Form H 12). 
